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Disappearing Dilemmas: Judicial Construction of
Ethical Choice as Strategic Behavior in the
Criminal Defense Context
Manuel Berrlez, Jamal Greene, and Bryan Leacht

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: A criminal defense attorney represents a
man accused of kidnapping and murdering two children in a residential
neighborhood. During the course of interviewing key witnesses, the defense
attorney becomes convinced that her client was present at the scene of the
murder. While her client denies having been present, his alibi changes entirely
from one interview to the next. The two main witnesses that the client offers to
corroborate his most recent alibi recant, suggesting to the defense attorney that
both they and the defendant were actually present at the scene of the crime.
Third parties confirm that these two witnesses were indeed together in the
vicinity of the crime along with an unidentified male with the same height and
build as the defendant. The defendant declines to take the stand at his trial, but
he asks his lawyer to make his alibi the centerpiece of his defense and to
emphasize the argument during her opening and closing remarks. Sensing that
his counsel may harbor misgivings, the defendant adds: "Look, we both know
this alibi is the best shot I've got."
How should the defense attorney proceed with respect to this alibi claim?
Supposing she declined to present this claim and her client ultimately lost at
trial, how should a reviewing court assess her performance? Would her
decision not to present the alibi claim constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel under current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence? If not, would this be
because she actually employed the best tactics possible for freeing her client or
rather because she appropriately fulfilled her duty of candor toward the
tribunal? Does it matter which way courts tend to construe this choice?
This Note contends that judicial choices in this regard matter a great deal.
The prevailing judicial treatment of scenarios such as the one described above
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2005. This paper is the winner of Notre Dame Law School's
Smith-Doheny Legal Ethics Writing Prize. The authors would like to thank Deborah Cantrell, Dennis
Curtis, and Steve Wizner for their invaluable insights and encouragement, the students of "Ethics in the
Practice of Law" for their thoughtful suggestions, and Carmen Alemdn-Berrdlez, Jennifer Gaudiani, and
Elora Mukherjee, without whose love and support this Note would not have been possible.
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is to represent the lawyer's decision as a strategic rather than as an ethical
choice. In our view, the prevailing treatment too lightly considers the profound
ethical dilemmas inherent in criminal defense work. This judicial tendency
yields many unfortunate byproducts. Among them, criminal defense attorneys
cannot afford to be open about the ethical considerations that go into selecting
particular defenses, and judges cannot afford to provide practical guidance
regarding when ethical reservations may justify deviating from the traditional
zealous advocacy model.
This Note calls for greater intellectual honesty in the treatment of these
difficult issues. By openly recognizing the importance of ethical
decisionmaking in the criminal defense context, judges and practitioners can
help to distinguish in the public mind between those strategic choices that
genuinely represent bad lawyering and those choices that actually reflect
laudable attempts to inject an ethical dimension into the criminal defense
process. To be clear from the outset, we are not proposing that criminal defense
lawyers pay closer attention to their ethical instincts at the expense of their
client's strategic interests. Rather, we believe that to whatever extent ethical
decisionmaking is already occurring, it goes largely unrecognized by a
judiciary that insists upon construing all representation decisions as somehow
motivated by the strategic best interests of the client.
Our thesis requires that one accept as axiomatic that a criminal defense
attorney's doubts concerning the accuracy of her client's proposed assertions
may give rise to strong. ethical misgivings. Depending on the severity of those
misgivings, she may consider several options, such as counseling her client to
alter his position, truncating her investigative duties, altering her trial strategy,
or privately voicing her concerns to the judge. When such situations arise, two
competing sets of values are called into question. On one hand, lawyers owe a
duty of loyalty to their clients that requires them to set aside personal mores
where doing so is necessary to further clients' best interests. In this respect,
lawyers operate as zealous advocates within an adversary system that arguably
depends upon two such advocates clashing before an audience of impartial fact
finders. On the other hand, lawyers possess a duty of candor to the tribunal and
an obligation as officers of the court to promote just outcomes, or at least not to
frustrate them knowingly. The tension between these broad commandments
recurs throughout the ethics discourse concerning the criminal defense
function.
When addressing the challenges facing criminal defense lawyers, the
drafters of professional ethical guidelines and authors of ethics advisory
opinions have explicitly acknowledged the tension between these values. For
instance, the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct observe that
"conflict[s] may arise between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations
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confidential and the duty of candor to the court."' In tackling such thorny2
issues, ethical guidelines have not always spoken with a consistent voice.
Nonetheless, the broad trend within the legal ethics community has been
toward affording lawyers greater discretion to make ethically-motivated
decisions rather than forcing them to proceed with potentially misleading
defenses. This is reflected in the ABA's recent Advisory Opinions as well as in
its revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, both of which suggest that
where an attorney reasonably believes evidence3 to be false or misleading, her
impulse toward candor may guide her decisions.
Whereas ethics authorities provide affirmative guidelines for professional
conduct, courts weigh in on the related question of when a lawyer's decision to
distance herself from her client's defense violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. By determining the proper
scope of this constitutional protection, courts heavily influence the extent to
which lawyers engage in the kind of ethically-motivated decisionmaking that
would come at the expense of the client's best interests. Where cases of
"known perjury" are concerned, courts now follow the Supreme Court's
guidance in Nix v. Whiteside, which insulates lawyers from federal ineffective

assistance challenges when they refuse on ethical grounds to suborn a witness's
perjury. 4 When the facts are changed somewhat, however, and the criminal
defense attorney harbors a level of suspicion short of actual knowledge, or a

client seeks to advance a misleading theory of defense without taking the stand,
courts follow no such bright-line rule, instead producing a wide range of fact-

specific holdings. 5
1. CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (1986), reprinted in SEC. OF STATE OF THE
STATE OF CONN., OFFICIAL 2004 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 24 (2004), available at

http://www.jud.state.ct.us/Publications/PracticeBook/pb2004partl.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
2. For instance, in the commentary to Professional Rule 3.3 governing candor to the tribunal, the
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct asserts that "[t]he advocate's task is to present the client's
case with persuasive force.... [A]n advocate does not vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause; the
tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value." Yet in the same paragraph, the guidelines
include the caveat that "performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified
by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal." Id. These statements point in different directions, and
the paragraph avoids answering the critical question of when a lawyer's duty of candor obligates her to
act based on her own assessment of the evidence.
3. Following the Ethics 2000 amendments, the commentary to Model Rule 3.3 governing candor to
the tribunal now reads: "Although [the rule] only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer
knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2003).
4. 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (holding that an attorney's refusal to help his client present perjured
testimony concerning whether the victim had brandished a gun did not violate the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of assistance of counsel).
5. See infra Part III. Compare United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2003)
(finding ineffective assistance of counsel where lawyer exercised moral choice to the detriment of his
client's best interests), with Jordan v. Warden, No. :CV-97-0465, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13475, at
*17-*29 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1998) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation on the grounds that counsel's
failure to investigate, interview potential witnesses, and apply evidentiary rules could qualify as a
potential trial strategy).
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The desirability of allowing lawyers to make private ethical determinations
concerning the nature of their legal representation depends in part on the level
of certainty that a lawyer possesses. For this reason, we may balk at the
prospect of a lawyer refusing to present an argument on the basis of a mere
hunch that a defendant's claims are untenable, yet encourage that lawyer to
sustain her moral objections when she reasonably believes on the basis of
concrete and credible information that her client is attempting to mislead the
fact finder.
Unfortunately, however, many courts have sidestepped the difficult
challenge of reconciling the lawyer's obligations of candor to the tribunal with
her duties to her clients. Instead of deciding under what circumstances (or
subject to what proof) ethical considerations warrant a departure from the
traditional adversarial model of representation, courts have taken another,
easier route-suggesting that a lawyer's choice potentially based on ethics was
in fact a strategic decision taken with the client's best interests in mind. For the
purposes of this Note, we describe this judicial tactic as "alignment theory"
because it defines away an important ethical dilemma by characterizing the
client's best interests as conveniently aligned with a lawyer's choices. This
approach, whether followed intentionally or simply through judges' blind
devotion to the language of strategic choice, obscures the fact that criminal
defense attorneys often confront situations in which their own ethical mores
point them in directions at odds with the clients' goal of receiving the lightest
possible punishment.
This reliance on alignment theory has produced several distorting effects,
the most interesting of which is that judges have preserved the necessary space
for ethical decisionmaking without having to acknowledge that they are in any
way deviating from the zealous advocacy model. Of course, this effect comes at
a cost: the judicial reluctance to account openly for this consideration
necessitates a series of intellectual exercises that strain the concept of strategic
choice to a breaking point. Moreover, for those who believe that the legal
profession should expand its conception of effective assistance to incorporate a
greater role for moral activism, the continued construction of ethical choice as
strategic behavior represents an unwelcome entrenchment of status quo norms.
At the very least it is ironic that in an attempt to relax the strictures of the
adversary system, courts have chosen to justify their decisions in the very terms
that assume that system's propriety and inevitability.
A second implication of the alignment theory has been courts' failure to
comment directly on the preferred balance between two sets of fundamental
values in the criminal justice system. By avoiding this issue altogether, courts
have offered little practical guidance to criminal defense attorneys who must
decide how to act when they doubt their clients' claims. Faced with deciding
how to represent their clients, lawyers will naturally consider how tightly courts
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have defined the boundaries of their moral autonomy under the Sixth
Amendment. Given current judicial tendencies, lawyers have strong incentives
to defend their earlier techniques of representation by highlighting the strategic
merits of their decisions, however implausible these may seem. Such incentives
are further reinforced by the fact that those lawyers who have candidly revealed
the naked ethical motivations behind their actions are more often sanctioned by
courts. The product of these incentives is an inconsistent system characterized
by nods and winks, where criminal defense attorneys may adjust their level of
representation on the basis of personal moral judgments as long as those
decisions are later framed as strategic choices taken in the client's best
interests.
After criticizing courts' alignment theories as often unpersuasive, this Note
advances two proposals. First, we advocate a more open judicial discourse
about the desirable balance between candor to the tribunal and zealous
advocacy, particularly in situations in which lawyers fear becoming complicit
players in the presentation of misleading defenses. Just as authors of
professional responsibility guidelines and ethics advisory opinions have done,
courts should articulate clearer standards for how lawyers ought to reconcile
competing duties inherent in their roles as criminal defense advocates. Simply
by recognizing that any Sixth Amendment inquiry into effectiveness of counsel
should take into account not only the strategic merits of a decision but also the
ethical constraints facing lawyers, courts would greatly promote the idea that
the adversary system must be tempered by certain ethical considerations.
As a secondary matter, we suggest a standards-based approach that courts
could use to balance the competing values of zealous advocacy and candor to
the tribunal. Notwithstanding criticisms about the potential for lawyers to abuse
their discretion as ethical decisionmakers, we argue for a system that affords
lawyers the flexibility to alter their representation when their decision is based
on a reasonable belief and concrete evidence that their client's defense is
untrustworthy. By requiring that attorneys have a testable basis before
withholding their unqualified support from a client and by entrusting courts to
police this evidentiary standard, such rules would avoid the spectacle of
lawyers supplanting the fact finder by imposing their own predeterminations of
guilt or innocence.
Critics may worry that such an approach would transform the criminal
defense attorney into yet another arm of the state, or allow the attorney to usurp
the jury's function of separating truth from fiction. While such objections are
understandable, they misconceive the nature of our proposal. The potential for
lawyers to act on an ethical misgiving already exists within the status quo, and
many cases suggest that lawyers are indeed altering their representation based
on their discomfort with particular defenses. In other words, lawyers are
already pre-screening the information received by juries, albeit under the mask

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 23:225, 2005

of strategic decisionmaking. Our purpose is not to encourage greater moral
activism but to bring the complexity of status quo choices out into the open.
Insofar as doing so would in itself preserve a role for ethical decisionmaking in
the criminal defense bar, we believe that it will have the positive effects of
preserving the core truth-seeking function of the criminal trial and reinforcing
the criminal defense lawyer's perception that she is a member of a learned
profession rather than a mere hired gun forced to make any argument, no matter
how disingenuous.
The remainder of this Note is divided into five Parts. Part II explores how
various authorities within the field of legal ethics have commented on the
potential tensions between a lawyer's duty of loyalty to her client and her
broader obligation to promote just outcomes. In particular, this Part examines
how model rules of professional responsibility and national ethics panel
opinions have evolved in their treatment of these dilemmas. Part III considers
the interplay between a lawyer's ethical decisionmaking and existing case law
addressing the Sixth Amendment standard for effective assistance of counsel.
By analyzing a series of factual scenarios, this Part discusses more concretely
how criminal defense lawyers must often reconcile the competing demands of
loyalty to the client and candor to the tribunal. Part III demonstrates how judges
have employed alignment strategies to avoid commenting on the proper balance
between competing ethical values. Having outlined the basic contours of
alignment theory, Part 1V critiques the substance of these arguments,
highlighting their implications for the broader project of expanding lawyers'
moral discretion within the strictures of the adversary system. It then advances
a specific proposal that lays the groundwork for greater moral activism while
avoiding its excesses.
II. ETHICAL RULES AND LAWYERS' ROLES

Professional rules of conduct have openly acknowledged that criminal
defense attorneys face difficult ethical dilemmas in their everyday work.
Indeed, these ethical guidelines often start from the basic premise that lawyers
must balance the competing duties of loyalty toward the client and candor
toward the tribunal. 6 Perhaps the strongest recognition of this tension can be
6. For instance, the American Bar Association has long insisted that lawyers act as zealous
advocates in pursuit of their clients' best interests. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 126 (3d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]
(noting, in commentary to Standard 4-1.2, that the adversary system requires counsel to be "guided
constantly by the obligation to pursue the client's interests"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-9 (1980) (observing that a "lawyer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests
of his client"). Yet the organized bar has also repeatedly emphasized the lawyer's role as an officer of
the court. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1, 7-19 (1980); CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 22, 32 (1908). See also ABA
STANDARDS, supra, at 126 (describing, in Standard 4-1.2(b), the basic duty of defense counsel as "an
officer of the court").
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seen in those rules that govern confidential communications and those that
address the lawyer's obligation not
to offer evidence or testimony that she
7
believes to be false or misleading.
Over time, professional guidelines have gradually placed a higher premium
on candor to the tribunal, relaxing the principle of zealous advocacy where it
has appeared necessary. The following Part documents the emergence of this
trend by analyzing how the most important national guidelines for lawyers'
professional conduct have evolved over the course of the twentieth century.
Specifically, we will consider the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, the 1969
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and various ABA ethics panel opinions. These sources,
read together, paint a compelling picture of how conventional legal wisdom has
shifted on the question of how best to balance the obligations of zealous
advocacy and candor to the tribunal.
A. Canons ofProfessionalEthics (1908)
In 1908, the ABA adopted its first formal code of attorney conduct-the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Although commentators have criticized the
Canons as vague and self-contradictory, 8 they represent an early exploration of
the tension between the lawyer's duties to client and court. For example, Canon
15 asserted that "[t]he lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability." 9 Somewhat cryptically, however, the same Canon
provided that "the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not
without the confines of the law" and that "[t]he office of attorney
does not
0
permit.., violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane."'
Other Canons also recognized the lawyer's role as an officer of the court.
For instance, Canon 22 stated that "[t]he conduct of the lawyer before the Court
and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness," adding
that "[i]t is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the

7. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.3 (2003) ("Candor Toward the
Tribunal"), with id. R. 1.6 ("Confidentiality of Information"). See also William H. Erickson, The
PerjuriousDefendant: A ProposedSolution to the Defense Lawyer's ConflictingEthical Obligations to
the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 77-79 (describing the dilemma that attorneys face who
know that their clients intend to commit perjury).
8. See Addison M. Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An
Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 28, 28 (1966) (describing the Canons as "so vague, so
ambiguous, and so contradictory that.., almost any position, on a given issue, can reasonably be

defended with support from the canons"); James E. Stars, Professional Responsibility: Three Basic
Propositions,5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17, 20 (1966) (describing the Canons as "glittering generalities" which
"lack a body to kick and a soul to condemn").
9. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
10. Id.
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facts ... in the presentation of causes."'" Consistent with this approach, Canon

29 claimed that in cases involving perjury, a lawyer "owe[s] it to the profession
and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting
endeavor to
authorities."' 12 Similarly, Canon 41 stated that a lawyer "should
'3
rectify" frauds or deceptions "unjustly imposed upon the court."'
It is worth noting, however, that while these Canons implicitly
acknowledged the competing roles of the lawyer as court officer and advocate,
none required the lawyer to act in a way inconsistent with the client's interests.
Although Canons 22, 29, and 41 announced their guidelines in aspirational
language aimed at encouraging lawyers to act ethically, they ultimately left
counsel free to champion her client's cause at any expense. Moreover, Canon
37 was unequivocal about the lawyer's role as advocate: "It is the duty of a
lawyer to preserve his client's confidences."' 4 In this first attempt to codify the
ethics of lawyering, these provisions, taken as a whole, suggest that the balance
struck in these rules favored the principle of zealous advocacy.
In 1953, the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances laid
doubt to rest by holding that Canon 37 imposed a paramount duty on the lawyer
to preserve the client's confidences, even in instances in which the client was
known to have committed perjury. 15 The Committee addressed the lawyer's
duty to disclose perjury in two situations. The first, a civil divorce case,
involved a client who informed his lawyer after the court had entered a divorce
decree in his favor that he had testified falsely. A truthful statement by the
client would have resulted in dismissal against the client. The second case
involved a criminal defense lawyer whose convicted client was given a more
lenient sentence of probation based upon a mistaken assessment of his criminal
record by the judge at the sentencing proceeding. The defense lawyer knew
from his client that the judge's information was incorrect. In addition to
considering whether the lawyer had to disclose the truth about his client's
record, the Committee also addressed the lawyer's obligation to correct her
defendant's misrepresentations before the court.
Recognizing the competing values at stake, the Committee insisted that in
interpreting the Canons, it was not abandoning the lawyer's "loyalty to the
court of which he is an officer." On the contrary, the panel construed the
lawyer's duty to the court in a way that embraced the model of zealous
advocacy:
Such loyalty [to the court] does not ...consist merely in respect for the
11. Id.Canon 22 (1908).
12. Id Canon 29 (1908).
13. Id.Canon 41 (1928).
14. Canon 37 was amended in 1937 to elaborate the provision of the original Canon 6 from 1908,
which articulated the lawyer's obligation to represent clients with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
their secrets or confidences. Id. Canon 37 (1937).
15. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
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judicial office and candor and frankness to the judge. It involves also the
steadfast maintenance of the principles which the courts themselves have
evolved for the effective administration of justice, one of the most firmly
established of which is the preservation undisclosed of the confidences
16
communicated by his clients to the lawyer in his professional capacity.
This opinion made clear that under the Canons, the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality trumped any duty of candor to the tribunal.
B.

Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

The 1908 Canons remained the ABA's official ethics code until 1969, when
the ABA replaced them with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code), 17 a revised and expanded version of the Canons. 18 Like its
predecessor, the Model Code sought to provide "clear, peremptory rules in the
critical areas relating most directly to the duty of lawyers to their clients and to
the courts.' 't9 The Model Code departed from the Canons somewhat by
expanding the obligation of candor to the tribunal, yet it, too, ultimately
reinforced the zealous advocacy model. Four of the Model Code's nine broad
statements of ethical norms declared that lawyers should preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client, 20 exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client, 2 1 and represent their clients competently 22 and
zealously. 23 As Eugene Gaetke has argued, "these obligations, rather than being
components of a lawyer's responsibility as officer of the court, assure that the
lawyer will act as an informed, devoted, and energetic agent of the client and
will elevate the client's interests above those of the judicial system and the
24
public."
Just as the ABA Committee had done in its 1953 panel opinion, the Model
Code characterized the lawyer's duty as an officer of the court in a manner that
seemed to encompass the lawyer's duty as a zealous advocate. Even more than
the ABA Committee Opinion had done, the Model Code assumed away the
16. Id.
17. For purposes of this discussion, we refer to the final version of the Model Code, which was
amended for the last time in 1980, unless otherwise noted.
18. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980). The Model Code, revised on numerous
occasions until 1980, was eventually adopted either verbatim or with minor modifications in every state.
See Jay S. Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47

VAND. L. REv. 339, 347 (1994).
19. See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1069 (1978)
(quoting from the 1965 annual address to the American Bar Association by former ABA President
Lewis Powell); see also Erickson, supra note 7, at 79.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).

21. Id.Canon5.
22. Id. Canon 6.
23. Id. Canon 7.
24. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39, 50-51 (1989)
(describing the Model Code).
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tension between candor to the tribunal and the duty of confidentiality.2 5 This
approach was neatly encapsulated in Ethical Consideration 7-19 of the Code,
which suggested that the "[t]he duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of
legal system
26
the law."
In fairness, the Model Code did suggest certain limits on the loyalty
requirement, especially when the lawyer knows her client intends to defraud the
court. Thus, several ABA Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations flatly
prohibited a lawyer from "[k]nowingly us[ing] perjured testimony or false
evidence," "[p]articipat[ing] in the creation or preservation of evidence when
he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false," and "[c]ounsel[ing] or
assist[ing] his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." 27 In 1975, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility reinforced this position, holding that a lawyer who knows in
advance that her client intends to use false or perjured testimony must advise
her client that she must take one of two courses of action: "[w]ithdraw at that
time in advance of the submission of the perjured testimony or false evidence,"
or "[r]eport to the court ...the falsity of the testimony or evidence, if the client
insists on so testifying." 28 Whereas the Model Code had spoken only in limited
terms of the lawyer's duty to withdraw from representation, the Commission
mandated that lawyers disclose the intended perjury to the tribunal if they could
not withdraw from representation.
Despite these significant strides in the direction of expanding lawyers'
moral autonomy, the Model Code continued to preserve the lawyer's role as
zealous advocate in much the same way as had the Canons. First, the Model
Code permitted, but did not require, a lawyer to disclose her client's intent to
testify untruthfully or present false evidence when the lawyer obtained her
information directly from the client. 29 Under this rule, a lawyer remained free
to place the interests of her client above the interests of the judicial system in
achieving just outcomes by deciding not to disclose her client's intent to

25.

Jd. at 51.

26. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980).
27. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4), (6)-(7). See also id. DR 2-110 (B)(2) (directing that "[a] lawyer
representing a client before a tribunal ... shall withdraw from employment ... [if h]e knows or it is
obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule," such as the use of
false evidence); id. EC 7-26 (prohibiting a lawyer from presenting evidence that "he knows, or from
facts within his knowledge should know ... is false, fraudulent, or perjured").
28. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975). The Committee
further explained that "[i]t is axiomatic that the right of a client to effective counsel in any case ... does
not include the right to compel counsel to knowingly assist or participate in the commission of perjury
or the creation or presentation of false evidence." Id.
29. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2), (3) (1980) ("A lawyer may
reveal ...[c]onfidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court
order... [and may reveal t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to
prevent the crime." (emphasis added)).
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deceive the tribunal. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) further reinforces the
lawyer's discretion to hold client confidences dear by exempting "privileged"
communications from the general rule requiring lawyers to disclose when their
clients intend to deceive the court. 30 The Model Code thus severely limited
attorneys' freedom to allow ethical considerations to influence trial strategy.
Finally, the ABA Committee, based on the privileged communication rule,
affirmed its earlier decision under the Canons prohibiting a lawyer from
disclosing to the court that her client had committed a fraud upon the court in
32
the past, 31 as distinguished from the client who intends to do so in the future.
The Committee held that in cases in which the lawyer finds in the course of the
trial that the client has committed perjury or presented false evidence, the
lawyer "has the primary duty to protect the confidentiality of any privileged
communication from his client." 33 Affirming the supremacy of the model of
zealous advocacy, the Committee concluded that the "confidential privilege, in
our opinion, must be upheld over any obligation of the lawyer to betray the
client's confidence in seeking rectification of any fraud that may have been
perpetrated by his client upon a person or tribunal. 34
The Model Code made clear that the lawyer could not participate in the
presentation of testimony or evidence she knew to be false, but it prohibited her
from disclosing to the tribunal when such a fraud had already been committed
against the court. Although the Model Code failed to give clear guidance to
lawyers as to how to proceed,3 5 it seems to have required that "client
confidences must be maintained, even though the lawyer's silence permits a
client to commit perjury with impunity." 36 As in the Canons before it, the
37
model of zealous advocacy triumphed in the Model Code.
30. Id. DR 7-102 (B)(1) ("A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that... [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a... tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud
to the... tribunal, except when the information is protectedas a privileged communication." (emphasis

added)).
31. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 287 (1953).
32. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 1314 (1975).
33. Id. The Committee noted that while the lawyer must "afford[] the client proper protection on
the basis of any privileged communication," the lawyer also has "the obligation to call upon his client to
rectify the fraud; and if the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer may withdraw at that point
from further representation of the client." Id.
34. Id. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) ("The
tradition (which is backed by substantial policy considerations) that permits a lawyer to assure a client
that information (whether a confidence or a secret) given to him will not be revealed to third parties is so
important that it should take precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR
7-102(B).").
35. See Erickson, supra note 7, at 79-81.
36. Barry R. Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge: Disclosure of Client Confidences Under the ABA
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 60 N.D. L. REV. 261, 269 (1984).
37. Accord Harold C. Petrowitz, Some Thoughts About Current Problems in Legal Ethics and
ProfessionalResponsibility, 1979 DUKE L.J 1275, 1279 ("The conclusion that must be drawn from [a]
review of the tensions created by the lawyer's competing obligations to the client and to the justice
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Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct

In 1983, the ABA adopted its third set of ethics guidelines, the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which substantially expanded the space
for lawyers to engage in ethical decisionmaking. As various commentators
have noted, part of the ABA's motivation in creating the Model Rules was to
emphasize the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. 3 8 The Model Rules thus

retreat from the Model Code's embrace of the zealous advocacy model, most
notably by lifting the major restriction on a lawyer's obligation to prevent fraud
in court proceedings. Toward this end, Model Rule 3.3 ("Candor to the
Tribunal"), as originally written, explicitly required that a lawyer take
"reasonable remedial measures" when she knows that a client has committed
39

perjury during a court proceeding, regardless of her duty of confidentiality.
The comments to the 1983 Model Rules note that such measures include, to the
extent necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.4n

As a 1987 ABA ethics panel opinion correctly noted, this new obligation
represented "a reversal of prior opinions of this Committee given under earlier
rules of professional conduct. ' 4 1 This trend has continued in recent years. For
example, more recent amendments to the Model Rules have made disclosure an

explicit remedial option within Rule 3.3 itself (as opposed to merely within the
comments).4 2 Most importantly, the 2003 revised comments for the first time
make clear that "[t]his duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer
' 43
of the court to prevent the fact finder from being misled by false evidence.

As it had before, however, the Commission struggled with the tension
between the lawyer's conflicting duties as advocate and officer of the court.
While recognizing that the "vitality of the adversary system.., depends upon
the ability of the lawyer to give loyal and zealous service to the client," the
system unmistakably indicates that the present [Model Code] makes the lawyer's duty to the client his
paramount responsibility.").
38. See, e.g., GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 347-48 (1985); Gaetke, supra note 24, at 61;
Petrowitz, supra note 37, at 1289.
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES 1983].

40. Id. R. 3.3. cmt. 10. Indeed, despite Model Rule 1.6, which expresses the duty of confidentiality
in broad terms, the language of Rule 3.3, its comments, and the comments to Rule 1.6 clearly require a
lawyer to take measures to remedy a client's known perjury. See also ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and
Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (confirming that "the lawyer's responsibility to disclose client
perjury to the tribunal under Rule 3.3 supersedes the lawyer's [duty of confidentiality] to the client
under Rule 1.6"); James R. McCall, Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role in Response to Perjury, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 443, 470 (1986).
41. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-3 53 (1987).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003). Comment 5 affirms this requirement,
noting that a lawyer must "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardlessof the
client's wishes." Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 5 (emphasis added). In addition, the comments to Rule 1.6 explain that
Rule 3.3 "requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted
by this Rule." Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 15.

43. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 5.
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Commission warned of the "corruption of the judicial process" and thus
avowed the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal. The Commission held that
"the lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to prevent the perjury, and if
the perjury has already been committed, to prevent its playing any part in the
judgment of the court. '4 4 The Commission described its rules as a means of
furthering the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice process:
This duty the lawyer owes the court is not inconsistent with ...the lawyer's duty to
preserve the client's confidences. For that duty is based on the lawyer's need for
information from the client to obtain for the client all that the law and lawful
process provide. Implicit in the promise of confidentiality is its nonapplicability
where the client seeks the unlawful end of corrupting the judicial process by false
evidence.45
In a sense, the Commission came dangerously close to assuming away the
very tension it was trying to resolve.
Notwithstanding this reasoning, the revised Model Rules are clear-cut when
it comes to known frauds committed upon the court. In sum, Rule 3.3 prohibits

a lawyer from making false statements of fact, failing to disclose to the court
controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be adverse to the position of
the client, and knowingly offering false evidence.46
The Model Rules also recognize that a lawyer may not always know when a
client is attempting to mislead the court. In doing so, however, the Model Rules
clearly allow the lawyer to act against the client's wishes in certain

circumstances in order to prevent a potential defrauding of the fact finder. For
example, Rule 3.3(a)(3) states that a "lawyer may refuse to offer evidence,
other than the testimony of the defendant, that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false. ' 4 7 Moreover, while Comment 8 to Rule 3.3 affirms that "a lawyer's
reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the

trier of fact," it also warns that a "lawyer cannot ignore an obvious

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.R. 3.3(a)(l)-(3). If the lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or seeks to
introduce fraudulent evidence, comments to the Rule advise the lawyer to first tryto persuade her client
that the evidence should not be offered; if the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must then refuse to
offer the evidence. Id. R. 3.3. cmt. 6. However, lawyers in some jurisdictions may be required to present
the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even in situations
where the lawyer knows that the statement is false. Id. cmt. 7. Similarly, ABA Formal Opinion 87-353
further explains that if the client wishes to testify but the lawyer refuses to offer the client's testimony,
"the lawyer may have no other choice than to disclose to the court the client's intention to testify
falsely." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987). The Model Rules
follow a similar course with respect to situations where the lawyer, having made a good-faith
presentation of evidence to the court, subsequently discovers that the evidence is false. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 10 (2003). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 ("A lawyer [in a civil case] who discovers that her client has lied in
responding to discovery requests must take all reasonable steps to rectify the fraud, which may include
disclosure to the court. In this context, the normal duty of confidentiality in Rule 1.6 is explicitly
superseded by the obligation of candor toward the tribunal in Rule 3.3.").
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003).
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falsehood, '' 48 which suggests that the lawyer is encouraged to examine closely
whether the evidence in question will deceive the court and thereby undermine
the fairness of the proceeding.
Although the Model Rules do not clearly resolve the issue of presumed (as
opposed to known) perjury or false evidence, they allow space for a lawyer to
employ ethical considerations to inform whether to present the evidence in
question. Moreover, in creating this space, the revised Model Rules vindicate
the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. Thus, while the comments to Model
Rule 3.3 acknowledge that the "[t]he disclosure of a client's false testimony can
result in grave consequences to the client," they also make explicit that
forbidding disclosure forces the lawyer to "cooperate in deceiving the court,
thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is
designed to implement. 'A9 In striking the balance between client loyalty and
candor to the tribunal, the Model Rules underscore the importance of the
lawyer's obligation to further the truth-seeking process: "Lawyers have a
fraudulent conduct
special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or
50
that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process."
As the preceding discussion has made clear, ethics authorities have weighed
the competing values of the adversarial system differently over time. The
developments culminating in the Model Rules support the assertion that the
general trend in recent years has been toward encouraging lawyers to actively
engage in ethical decisionmaking. The ethical rules have achieved this by
explicitly recognizing lawyers' dual roles as officers of the court and zealous
advocates in the more traditional sense. Over time, professional rules of
conduct have gradually afforded lawyers greater discretion to act upon moral
judgments about the propriety of evidence and defenses in the course of
fulfilling their duties as officers of the court. In light of this trend, we next
consider the relationship between the lawyer's ethical decisionmaking and case
law addressing the Sixth Amendment standard for effective assistance of
counsel.
III.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND "ALIGNMENT THEORY"

At the margins, an attorney's dual obligation to the truth-seeking process
and to her client's individual interests implicates the doctrine of ineffective
assistance of counsel. While the Sixth Amendment, in its discussion of legal
support, guarantees criminal defendants only the right "to have the assistance of
counsel" for their defense, 51 that language has been construed as guaranteeing

48. Id. R. 3.3. cmt. 8.
49. Id.cmt. 11.
50. Id. cmt. 12.
51.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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more than just a warm body who once passed the state bar. Strickland v.
Washington,5 2 the leading Supreme Court case on ineffective assistance of
counsel, establishes the doctrinal framework. To satisfy the Sixth Amendment
mandate, "assistance of counsel" must be "reasonably effective." 53 To the
extent that reviewing courts adopt a client-centered definition of "effective"
representation, providing greater leeway for morally-centered decisionmaking
may raise constitutional objections.5 4 Surely lawyers at times face situations in
which the Sixth Amendment does not permit an attorney to serve two masters.
While ethics materials have been relatively forthright about the potential
intractability of the client versus candor dilemma, courts considering claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel have been far more ambivalent. Instead of
acknowledging the existence of opposing values and explicitly providing space
for criminal defense attorneys to be informed by moral instincts, courts
frequently operate under what we describe as an "alignment theory." Simply
put, the alignment theory posits that conflicts between zealous advocacy and
candor to the tribunal are not conflicts at all. Instead, looking back on a
particular fact pattern, courts may determine that the morally activist lawyer
was, true to a client-centered definition of effective advocacy, acting in the best
interests of the defendant.
We do not mean to suggest, even in the cases we will consider in this Part,
that zealous advocacy and candor never actually demand the same conduct
from an attorney, nor that judges are uniformly disingenuous in holding
conduct to have potentially been in the client's best interest. In some cases, to
be sure, judges intentionally ignore the moral dimensions of attorney conduct,
whether simply to adhere to the language of Strickland, to evade a finding of
ineffective assistance they feel the doctrine otherwise compels, or to avoid
unfavorable appellate review. In other cases, judges may be so attuned to the
rhetoric of the adversary system that they unwittingly rely upon it even when it
is not the most appropriate rationale for attorney conduct. The alignment theory
embraces both situations by positing that when faced with a case in which an
attorney's actions might plausibly be explained either as a moral decision,
consistent with the requisites of truth-seeking but potentially in tension with the
client's best interests, or as a tactical decision that may have been in the client's
best interests but just failed to pan out, courts opt for the latter. That is, instead
of acknowledging conflict and deferring to the lawyer's moral judgment, courts
downplay conflict and defer to her strategic judgment. Thus courts resolve
difficult cases by imagining a hypothetical universe free from tension between
zealous advocacy and ethical decisionmaking. Instead of scrutinizing the record
52. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
53. Id. at 687-88.
54. Assistance of counsel is considered a "fundamental" right that extends to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
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to make the difficult decision whether that universe is real, courts decide
whether it is merely possible. As we intend to show, almost invariably it is. 55
Crucial to the effective operation of both intentional and unintentional
alignment theory is the language of Strickland,which makes strategic deference
the leitmotif of an inquiry into constitutionally defective assistance of counsel.
A court reviewing attorney performance alleged ineffective "must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.' 56 Because of Strickland's strong emphasis on
preserving a lawyer's autonomy to craft trial strategy, judges have ample cover
to resolve ineffective assistance of counsel cases without ever deciding whether
a tension between zealous advocacy and candor to the tribunal exists in any
individual case. Instead, they can simply attribute any conduct to trial strategy,
no matter how plausible or legitimate. The alignment theory thus allows the
expansive contours of strategic deference to swallow a morally solicitous
course of conduct without courts ever having to evaluate that course's
propriety.

Discussing cases in which we believe courts to be relying on an alignment
theory presents obvious methodological difficulties that we must acknowledge
in advance. Because ineffective assistance of counsel challenges are necessarily
raised in ex post collateral proceedings, 57 the record we see is always
backward-looking. Given the degree of reverence for the adversarial system in
American jurisprudence, surely there are cases in which both attorneys and trial
courts take the position, ex ante, that loyalty to one's client must trump candor
to the tribunal at all times. In such situations, what appears to be strategy
actually may be such, and neither attorneys nor courts are engaging in any form
55. It is worth mentioning that this reflexive focus on trial strategy reaches well beyond the limits
of ineffective assistance of counsel cases. State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86 (Conn. 1986), a Connecticut state
constitutional case, applied similar deference to "tactical" decisions by attorneys in a compulsory
process case. The defendants, Michael Davis and Sherman Adams, sought to call two alibi witnesses
against the advice of their lawyers, but were rebuffed by the trial court. Id. at 87. Davis and Adams
invoked Article I, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution, which grants the accused "a right to be
heard by himself and by counsel." Id. (quoting CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8). They suggested that the use of
the words "by himself' intended to rest ultimate tactical authority in the hands of the defendant alone.
Id. at 88. Although the claim in Davis was not ineffective assistance of counsel, the court's use of
deference to defuse a potential moral conflict was strikingly similar. "It has been generally recognized,"
the court said, "that decisions concerning matters of trial strategy and tactics rest with the lawyer, as
opposed to decisions concerning such inherently personal rights of fundamental importance to the
defendant." Id. at 89. Rather than discussing whether the decision to call these alibis was truly in the
clients' interests, the court managed to put the question in the background. This deference has a long
pre-Stricklandhistory that is beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 674 F.2d
848, 855 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("This Court will not second-guess tactical decisions of counsel in deciding
whether to call certain [alibi] witnesses.").
56. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted).
57. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) ("[I]n most cases a motion brought
under [federal habeas] is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective-assistance.").
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of subterfuge. Acknowledging that it is often impossible to know what exactly
is motivating lawyers and judges in an individual case, we ask only for the
reader to accept as axiomatic that there are also cases in which lawyers are in
fact motivated by moral considerations that courts either will not or cannot
recognize. We believe we have identified several specific cases in which this is
difficult to deny, and we are confident that the reader will be similarly
persuaded.
We will concretize our conception of alignment theory by examining the
judicial reasoning in several different ineffective assistance of counsel cases.
Subpart A will discuss a paradigm situation that is perhaps the least susceptible
to alignment theory: the case of a client who has made clear to his lawyers that
he intends to testify falsely. Subpart B will discuss the scenario of an attorney
who suspects that evidence other than her client's own testimony may be
unreliable. Subpart C considers the dilemma that arises when an attorney must
decide whether to advance a theory of defense that she believes to be false.
Finally, Subpart D will address certain situations that resist categorization in
which lawyers must resolve a tension between zealous advocacy and
obligations of candor toward the tribunal.
A.

Scenario One: Known Client Perjury

Before outlining those scenarios in which we find that courts systematically
rely upon the alignment theory, it is useful to discuss one particular scenario in
which they do not: known perjury. Attorneys faced with a client who tells them
she will perjure herself on the stand need not-indeed cannot58-participate59
actively in that perjury, even if doing so is plainly in the client's best interest.
A court cannot simply assume away a conflict between zealous advocacy and
candor when a client has proposed to lie on the stand. Put another way, the
alignment theory becomes dysfunctional when the weight of the competing
interests-the right to testify and the duty of candor-is so great.
Indeed, in the area of known client perjury, the Supreme Court has
foreclosed an alignment strategy entirely. The right to testify in one's defense,
though absent from the specific language of the Constitution, has taken on
constitutional dimensions. It acquires such force from the language of three
separate amendments: the Fifth Amendment right not to testify, the Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process, and the Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process. 60 Thus, impairing a defendant's right to take the stand in her

58. In this respect, attorneys are not immune from the reach of the criminal law. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Dead Man's Privilege: Vince Foster and the Demise of Legal Ethics, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 807, 822, 847 n.132 (1999).
59. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
60. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987); see also United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488
(11 th Cir. 1990) (reversing conviction where the lower court forced the defendant to choose between the
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own defense risks offending a constitutional imperative. Moreover there are
plainly situations in which allowing one's client to lie on the stand comports
quite nicely with her best interests. Consider the hypothetical case of a police
officer defending against a charge of excessive use of force in apprehending a
robbery suspect. Where the word of a law enforcement officer would be
rebutted only by the word of the plaintiff, an accused thief, it might well
behoove the officer to issue a false statement, particularly in a law-and-order
town. 6 1 Needless to say, it strains credibility for a court to justify the conduct of
a defense attorney who refuses to participate in such testimony as strategic
decisionmaking in her client's best interests.
In this clear case of conflict between an attorney's moral obligations and
her obligations to her client, the Supreme Court has spoken unambiguously:
under Nix v. Whiteside, the fundamental right to testify does not include the
right to testify falsely.62 Whiteside involved a murder defendant who, wishing
to establish a claim of self-defense, told his attorney in confidence that
although he believed his victim had a gun in his hand, he had not actually seen
the gun.63 Shortly before the trial the defendant, who intended to take the stand
in his own defense, further told his attorney, "If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm
dead." 64 The attorney informed the defendant that testifying to seeing a gun
would be perjury, and that it would be his duty to inform the court of such.65
The defendant took the stand and, heeding his counsel's advice, testified that he
did not see a gun. He was convicted, and later raised an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim for his lawyer's refusal to help him prepare perjured
testimony. Declaring that "the Constitution prevails over rules of professional
ethics," the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that counsel had
provided ineffective assistance. 66 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Whiteside Court relied directly on Strickland, decided the previous
year. Though the point is easily obscured in its language about deference to
right to testify and the fight to counsel); cf Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)
(referring to the right to testify in one's own defense as one of several that "though not literally
expressed in the [Constitution], are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process"). The
development of an implicit constitutional right to testify is ironic in light of the common law prohibition
against defendant testimony, premised on the strong incentive for perjury. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 49. But
see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword-Sixth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 698 (1996) ("If
the accused... is generally empowered to drag a human being, against her will into the courtroom...,
surely he must also enjoy the lesser-included rights to present other truthful evidence that in no way
infringes on another human being's autonomy. These lesser-included rights are plainly presupposed by
the Compulsory Process Clause ...").
61. Cf People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 121-22 (Colo. 1983) (ordering disclosure of complaints
charging excessive use of force against police officer, since "[wihen the only prosecution witnesses are
the police officers involved, anything that goes to their credibility may be exculpatory").
62. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 174.
63. Id. at160.
64. ld.at 161.
65. Id.
66. Whiteside v.Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1984)
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tactical decisionmaking, Strickland expressly contemplated a role for ethics in
defining reasonable professional assistance. 67 In addition to counsel's basic
duties to serve as a loyal advocate, to consult with her client, and to equip
herself with sufficient skill and knowledge, Strickland recognized a broader
duty of reasonable assistance that may derive content by reference to
"prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like .... .68 The Whiteside Court accepted this invitation. In
holding that a lawyer's duty to her client does not encompass a duty to assist in
the presentation of perjured testimony, the Court relied directly on Canons 32
and 37 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, 69 disciplinary rule 7-102 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 70 and Rule 1.2 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 7' as well as state common law and statutory
72
treatment of perjury as a crime.
Thus, after Whiteside, lower courts applying Strickland to cases of known

client perjury could not employ anything like an alignment theory. The
Supreme Court had acknowledged the presence of an obvious conflict between
candor and zealous advocacy, and it had instructed courts how to proceed.73
Yet, as the Whiteside Court recognized, known client perjury was the easy case:
In some future case challenging attorney conduct in the course of a state-court trial,
we may need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to recognized
canons of ethics, the standards established by the state in statutes or professional
codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining the proper scope and limits on that
conduct. Here we
74 need not face that question, since virtually all of the sources speak
with one voice.
67. Stricklandmay be read so broadly as to provide a plenary guide to the weighing of ineffective
assistance claims. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) ("[T]he Strickland test provides
").State
sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims ....
courts have almost universally applied the Strickland standard under their state constitutions. See
Richard Klein, Gideon-A Generation Later: The Constitutionalizationof Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1471 (1999). Hawaii provides a notable exception. See Briones v. State,
848 P.2d 966, 977 (Haw. 1993) (calling the federal standard of what constitutes an ineffective action or
omission "unduly restrictive").
68. Strickland,466 U.S. at 688.
69. Canon 32 states that no lawyer should "render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the
law... or deception or betrayal of the public." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 32 (1908). Canon 37,
which was added to the Canons in 1928 and later amended in 1937 to more forcefully emphasize the
lawyer's duty to preserve client confidences, states with reference to the attorney-client privilege that the
"announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which [the
attorney] is bound to respect." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37 (1937).
70. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1980) (prohibiting a lawyer from
"knowingly us[ing] perjured testimony or false evidence").
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) ("[A] lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . .
72. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166-69.
73. For a sampling of cases directly applying Whiteside to known client perjury, see, for example,
United States v. Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986); Schockley v. Keamey, No. 95-207-SLR, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10939 (Del. July 25, 1996); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, No. 9673CF0312, 2000
Mass. Super. LEXIS 486 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 18, 2000); People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y.
2001); State v. Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740 (W.Va. 1993).

74. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 165-66.
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Despite the constitutional implications of interference with the right to
testify, the Whiteside Court was able to resolve the dilemma by relying on
canons, codes, ethics rules, and plain old common sense, all of which pointed it
towards not requiring attorneys to assist in presenting perjured testimony.75 The
luxury of reinforcement gave it sufficient cover to announce a clear conflict,
and then resolve that conflict authoritatively. But the Court has not yet
conducted the more searching inquiry it reserved for future cases in which the
answer to the dilemma is less clear. It is such cases to which we now turn.
B.

Scenario Two: Suspected FalseEvidence

Whatever post-Whiteside consensus courts may have developed by
responding to a conflict between candor to the tribunal and the strategic
interests of perjuring clients disintegrates as the scenario broadens to include
other kinds of dishonesty. One such "gray area" is suspicion that evidence the
defendant wishes to introduce lacks trustworthiness.
When such evidence is in the form of personal testimony, courts have found
that the defendant's constitutional right to testify dictates that a lawyer not
refuse to assist in presenting that testimony on suspicion alone, even if such
suspicion is reasonable. In United States v. Midgett,76 for example, the court
was faced with an ineffective assistance claim against an attorney who refused
to aid his client in presenting testimony he believed to be false, though his
client never told him that it was false. Paul Midgett, charged with a codefendant with robbing a man and lighting him on fire, claimed that a mystery
third assailant had committed the crime while he sat in a drug-induced sleep in
the back of a car. 77 The defense lacked any other corroboration and was
specifically refuted by Midgett's co-defendant, who was cooperating with the
government. 78 Nevertheless, Midgett persisted in his "third person" defense
throughout the preparation of his case.79 The court found ineffective assistance
because "[d]efense counsel's responsibility to his client was not dependent on
whether he personally believed Midgett, nor did it depend on the amount of
proof supporting or contradicting Midgett's anticipated testimony.' 80 In short,
"[d]efense counsel's mere belief, albeit a strong one supported by other
evidence, was not a sufficient basis to refuse Midgett's need for assistance in

75.

But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 120 (1990) (suggesting

that a lawyer whose client insists on presenting perjured testimony "examine the client in the normal
professional manner and.., argue the client's testimony to the jury in summation to the extent that
sound tactics justify doing so").
76. 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 322.
78. Id. at 326.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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81
presenting his own testimony."
The Midgett court eschewed an alignment theory. It acknowledged a client
versus candor dilemma, but found that in light of the constitutional weight
attached to the right to testify, the client's interests should take precedence.

What Midgett underscores, however, is that courts seem unwilling to recognize

any moral equivalence between presenting a perjuring client and presenting
other kinds of arguably false evidence. One would assume that courts would
generally have an easier time allowing lawyers to be motivated by their moral
compasses when a defendant seeks to utilize false or misleading evidence.

After all, the constitutional weight on the presentation of witnesses in one's
defense is lighter than that which attaches to the right to testify oneself. The
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, wherein one might logically
ground a constitutional challenge to a lawyer's
82 burdening of this
• •or- a court's
right, has never been held to extend to perjuring witnesses. Indeed, the right is

so neutered as not to guarantee defendants the right to make decisions about
which witnesses to call on their behalf. 83 By contrast, a perjuring defendant
cannot for that reason alone be wholly deprived of the opportunity to take the
stand. 84 Thus, for a court to require an attorney to present witness testimony she
departure from Whiteside and would lack
knows to be false would be a direct
85

any constitutional justification.

81. Id. For discussions of the standard of knowledge to be applied to client perjury, compare United
States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 446 (8th Cir. 1988) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether a lawyer who suspected his client of perjury and presented the testimony in narrative form had a
"firm factual basis"), with United States v. Omene, 143 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to find
ineffective assistance even though the attorney who suspected perjury and forced his client to testify in
narrative form failed to articulate a firm factual basis for so suspecting). See also State v. Hischke, 639
N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2002) (weighing the costs and benefits of forcing a client to testify only in narrative
form when the attorney suspects perjury); State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204 (Wis. 2003) (same).
82. But see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (suggesting greater constitutional scrutiny of
burdens on the calling of witnesses). The Washington Court struck down as arbitrary a Texas statute that
barred principals, accomplices, and accessories to the same crime from testifying for each other. The
Court reasoned that an a priori determination that such witnesses were unreliable was "absurd." Id. at
22. The Court later relied on Washington to suggest that the right to compulsory process was not
deprived unless the excluded witness testimony "would have been both material and favorable to [the]
defense." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). As a matter of law, such
materiality cannot be established where the attorney knows the testimony to be perjured. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ("A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless
decisionmaker ...").
83. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (reiterating that the attorney decides which issues to
raise on appeal); Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1434 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that whether
to call a witness is widely considered to be a "non-fundamental decision[ ]" and thus properly in the
hands of attorneys); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999) (listing decisions for
which lawyer must defer to client).
84. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532-34 (1 th Cir. 1992) ("[A] criminal defendant
has a fundamental constitutional right to testify in his or her own behalf at trial."); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 6, at 200 (stating, in Standard 4-5.2(a), that the decision "whether to testify in his or her own
behalf' is reserved to the accused).
85. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[C]ounsel is precluded from.., in
any way assisting the client in presenting false evidence .. ").For an application of Whiteside to
known witness perjury, see Noel v. State, 26 S.W.3d 123 (Ark. 2000) (refusing to find ineffective
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Yet, a mere suspicion that a witness lacks credibility is another matter
altogether. People v. Beals describes the paradigm situation. 86 In his "drive-by"
murder trial, Brian Beals offered the testimony of two of his friends to support
his insistence that the actual assailant was an unidentified man who was trying
to shoot Beals. Beals' attorney entered, with the prosecution, two stipulations to
prior inconsistent statements made by the witnesses in earlier meetings in his
office. 87 In the words of the lower court, the defendant's attorney "destroy[ed]
the credibility of the only witnesses to corroborate defendant's version of
events. ' 88 In applying its own version of the Strickland test, the Illinois
Supreme Court described the attorney's stipulations "a matter of sound trial
strategy. ' 89 That is, had the defense attorney not stipulated to the prior
inconsistent statements, the State could have introduced them in a more
damaging manner, such as calling the defendant's sister, who was present when
the statements were made, as a witness against Beals. 90 Thus, the defendant
"failed to overcome 'the strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within
91
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. '
Beals exemplifies the alignment theory at work. That the stipulations might
have been a matter of trial strategy we do not dispute. Rather, we note that the
opinion does not mention the possibility that stipulating to prior inconsistent
statements of one's witness enhances the truth-seeking function of the criminal
justice process. In this case, refusal to stipulate would have amounted to the
type of shell game that relates at most tangentially to truth but that we have
unfortunately come to expect from the adversarial system. Thus, the Illinois
Supreme Court reduces its analysis to a cynical assessment of whether the
defense attorney's conduct might plausibly, through some hypothetical twist of
fate, have been in the defendant's best interests and thus justified under the
reasoning of the adversarial process.
92
A similar dynamic can be identified in the case of Garrett v. Dormire.
Alexander Garrett was convicted of first-degree murder, assault, and armed
criminal action for fatally shooting his girlfriend, Peggy Bracken, on April 14,
1987. 93 At Garrett's second trial, the State introduced the testimony of Henry
Miller, a former jailmate of Garrett's, who testified that Garrett had confessed
assistance when lawyer refused to present witness who had indicated a willingness to lie). See also
United States v. Witherspoon, 557 A.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing whether lawyer who
unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw from representation due to ethical concerns over witnesses had a
legitimate conflict with defendant).
86. 643 N.E.2d 789 (Il1. 1994).

87. Id. at 793.
88. 618 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
89. 643 N.E.2d at 793.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 794.
Id.
237 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 947.
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to the murder and the assault to him in jail.94 He further testified that Garrett
told him that he Garrett plead not guilty because the police had not found the
murder weapon. 95 Although Garrett's attorney attempted to impeach Miller on
cross-examination, she did not introduce certain witnesses who Garrett claimed
would have established that Miller held a grudge against him. 96 Garrett raised
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his state and federal habeas
petitions.
The substance of the alleged grudge was, inter alia, that Miller was jealous
of Garrett's drawing abilities. 97 His attorney testified at a post-conviction
hearing that she did not call the witnesses because "she did not believe the jury
would find it credible that Mr. Miller would testify against someone in a
homicide case because of jealousy over drawing ability." 98 The state court
found no ineffective assistance because "counsel's decision not to interview or
call any inmate witnesses was a matter of trial strategy," and the federal habeas
court agreed. 99
The alignment theory operates more at the level of justification than at the
level of rationale. That is, it concerns itself more with how a decision has been
justified ex ante than why the decision was actually made. Trial strategy may
well have dictated that Garrett's attorney not call witnesses to the stand who
would make implausible and impeachable statements to the jury. Yet again it is
noteworthy that the court need not mention the possibility that Garrett's
attorney herself doubted the veracity of the witnesses. Unlike the situation of
client perjury, the credibility of the witnesses was not itself an issue for the
court. Treating witness credibility as an issue in itself would have raised the
specter of an attorney's moral decision not to present suspicious testimony
conflicting with the best interests of her client. Instead, the only issue was
whether the attorney was reasonable in believing that the jury would not find
the witnesses credible. If so, Strickland deference applies, and acts as a broad
umbrella protecting the attorney's decisions from moral scrutiny.
Looking back upon the cases we have discussed thus far, an intriguing
pattern emerges. In those cases where courts have been called upon to review
an attorney's decision not to present suspected false evidence, they have tended
to employ alignment theory. By contrast, in cases where courts have been asked
to review an attorney's decision not to present suspected perjuring clients, they
94. Id. at 948.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 948-49.
97. Id. at 949.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 949-50. For similar holdings, see, for example, Jacobs v. McDaniel, 5 Fed. Appx. 582,
583 (9th Cir. 2001) (mem.) (stating that the decision not to call non-credible witness was a "sound
tactical decision"); Tunstall v. Hopkins, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1059 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding that the
decision not to introduce perjured deposition testimony was justified because it could not be impeached
on the stand).
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have proven more willing to acknowledge ethical dilemmas. One possible
explanation for this pattern may be that a court's willingness to resort to
alignment theory depends on the extent to which the attorney conduct in
question falls within the usual scope of an attorney's discretion. If instead such
conduct infringes directly upon the defendant's right to testify, courts are more
attentive to the tension introduced.
People v. Toma 00 presents an interesting application of this nuance. Adil
Toma testified through an interpreter and raised an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because, inter alia, his lawyer failed to ask him sufficient
questions to spin his story into one that did comport with the physical evidence
in the record. 10 Although Toma involved defendant testimony, the court, true
to an alignment theory, treated the lawyer's decision as a tactical decision in the
best interests of the defendant. 10 2 The court relegated to a footnote (footnote
sixteen) the possibility that "failure to nail down the details of the defendant's
story.., was the only way that counsel could aid defendant in presenting his
story within counsel's ethical obligation not to knowingly offer evidence that
counsel knows to be false."' 10 3 Grounding its holding more firmly in an
attorney's ethical obligations would have forced the court to acknowledge a
potential inconsistency between the lawyer's moral inclinations and the
interests of his client. Instead, over a vigorous but lone dissent that challenged
the view that the lawyer was plausibly assisting his client's defense, 10 4 the
majority framed the facts to suggest that he was strategically acting in the
defendant's interests.
The question of whether the attorney in Toma was employing reasonable
trial strategy was the easiest debate for the dissent and the majority to have, but
it was by no means the only one possible. The two opinions could instead have
debated whether, per footnote sixteen, the attorney's decision to restrict his
client's testimonial options was an appropriate resolution of the client versus
candor dilemma. That is, the court could have treated the decision more like a
client perjury situation than a false evidence situation. One potential
explanation is that Toma most directly implicated a lawyer's line of questioning
rather than the question of whether to allow testimony in the first place.
Because the constitutional right to testify was not front and center as much as in
Whiteside and Midgett, the court had sufficient cover to avoid the ethical issue
and retreat to an alignment theory. Decisions concerning what questions to ask
100. 613 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2000).
101. Id.at 704.
102. Id. at 705 ("[lit would have been dangerously inept of [counsel] to intentionally provide
defendant with the opportunity to offer more details ....
").
103. Id. at 704 n. 16. As the dissent points out, counsel did not testify that he knew the story to be
false. Id. at 708 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The use of the word "knows" in the majority opinion allows the
court to use the cover of Whiteside.
104. Id. at 707 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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a witness or which witnesses to present are invariably in the attorney's hands.
Therefore, such decisions may be easier for courts to place under the rubric of
trial strategy than decisions over whether to allow a potentially perjuring
defendant testify conventionally. In short, it appears that the closer a decision to
the traditional defense attorney function, the more seductive is the lure of
alignment theory.
C. Scenario Three: UnreliableDefense Theory
The Toma case evokes a related but distinct species of dishonest lawyering,
the presentation of an unreliable defense. The scenario reaches the core of the
criminal defense function. The reader may be aware of the 1959 Otto
Preminger film Anatomy of a Murder, in which Jimmy Stewart plays an artful
defense attorney who, in one memorable scene, interviews a client who killed a
man for raping his wife. The client, played by Ben Gazzara, believes that the
killing was justifiable revenge. Disabusing him, Stewart explains, "What you
need is a legal peg so the jury can hang up their sympathy in your behalf, you
follow me? What's your legal excuse?" Gazarra replies, "Maybe I was mad."
Stewart shakes him off. "I mean, I must have been crazy." Silence. Gazarra
continues, "Am I getting warmer?". As Stewart leaves the room, he tells
Gazzara to "see if you can remember how crazy you were." 1 °5 The difficulty
much of the legal community has in appreciating the moral dilemma this tactic
introduces is evidenced by a survey of lawyers and judges at the 1999 annual
conference of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Asked whether Stewart's
character "crossed the line," more than half of the 189 respondents said no.106
Because defense theories are so commonly conceived as quintessentially
strategic, no matter how illegitimate, a lawyer's refusal to present or even
investigate an unreliable defense on moral grounds is a prime candidate for the
use of an alignment theory.
As with the presentation of false evidence in general, a defendant has no
constitutional right to present non-meritorious defenses.10 7 But short of the
known perjury situation, the Supreme Court has never recognized an attorney's
discretion to refuse to offer non-frivolous arguments on ethical grounds. That
is, the Court has given no firm command as to how a reviewing court should

105. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959).

106. Jonathan Ringel, Did Stewart as Lawyer 'Cross the Line?', FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
May 13, 1999, at 7.
107. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988) ("Neither paid nor appointed
counsel may deliberately mislead the court with respect to either the facts or the law, or consume the
time and the energies of the court or the opposing party by advancing frivolous arguments."); Whiteside,

475 U.S. at 166. But cf Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (striking down a California rule that
allowed a court-appointed appellate attorney to withdraw through summary procedure when she believes
an indigent's appeal is frivolous). A revised California rule allowing the attorney wishing to withdraw to
submit a merits brief for judicial review was upheld in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
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respond were Jimmy Stewart's character to refuse to argue or investigate an
insanity defense based on his strong suspicion that Gazarra's character was
obscuring the truth. Strickland itself set the constitutional standard for
reasonableness within the context of a claim for under-investigation:
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations... ,,108 Moreover,
reasonable investigation may be influenced by the statements of the defendant:
"[W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain
to pursue
investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure
10 9
unreasonable."'
as
challenged
be
later
not
may
those investigations
Presumably, where a defendant's statements and actions create suspicion
that a particular lead is fabricated or dishonest, the Strickland test would not
support a finding of ineffective assistance. But the use of the words "fruitless or
even harmful" suggests that the test contemplates an inquiry not into the
credibility of the lead but into its exculpatory value. That is, the question is not
whether a particular defense theory is true but whether it is likely to persuade a
fact finder. These are different inquiries, though in practice they may produce
the same result: greater discretion for the lawyer. A credibility test gives moral
discretion and an "exculpatory value" test gives strategic discretion. Returning
to our Anatomy of a Murder hypothetical, if Jimmy Stewart's character were to
decide not to pursue an insanity defense, he would be immunized against Sixth
Amendment challenge. He would not, however, be immunized because the
defense was contrary to truth; rather, he would be immunized because the
defense was (hypothetically) impeachable and thus (hypothetically) poor
strategy.
In large measure, actual judicial approaches to an attorney's refusal to
pursue suspicious defenses have toed a similar line. Consider Jordan v.
Warden, in which the defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his
murder trial because his attorneys allegedly failed to adequately investigate and
interview alibi witnesses after the defendant admitted his presence at the
murder. 10 Jordan admitted to law enforcement officers on eight separate
108. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 754 (1983) ("[A defendant] has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client .. "). But see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003)
(finding ineffective assistance where failure to investigate a meritorious defense "resulted from
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment"); State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204, 228 (Wis. 2003)
("While a trial attorney has considerable latitude to select one trial strategy from among many
alternatives, he or she must not abandon a sound strategy based merely 'upon a whim."' (citation
omitted)).
109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
110. Jordan v. Warden, No. 1:CV-97-0465, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13475 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31,
1998).
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occasions that he had been present during the murder, and told the same to his
attorneys."' Given these admissions, the court found that not investigating a
laundry list of proposed theories premised on the defendant's non-presence at
the murder scene "was consistent with the defense's theory of the case."' 12
Jordan alleged furthermore that his attorney was unreasonable in failing to
investigate a theory that the victim was not strangled by a camera strap. Given
that Jordan told defense counsel that the camera strap was the murder weapon,
the court found that "such testimony would go against the strategy that
Petitioner had decided on."'1 13 Apparently that strategy was "the truth." Most
fascinating is the court's response to defense counsel's unwillingness to call to
the stand three alibi witnesses, all of whom he "knew to be unreliable and,
therefore, not worth interviewing."' 114 In light of the "numerous incriminating
statements Jordan had given," the "strategy" of not presenting an alibi defense
was called "perfectly reasonable" because the witnesses would have been easy
15
to impeach on the witness stand.'
The alignment theory has little to say about whether an alibi defense
actually represents sound trial strategy when the defendant has admitted his
presence at the crime scene to police. It may well be that defense counsel's
investigatory decisions inured to the defendant's benefit. What is striking is the
scant attention the court paid to the moral probity of investigating false leads.
The Jordan court mentions ethical obligations once, almost parenthetically, to
note that knowing use of false testimony is prohibited under Whiteside.1 16 The
court seems to take great pains to suggest that the dispositive element of an
ineffective assistance of counsel defense is whether the conduct was
strategically appropriate. Little space is devoted to the argument, which would
potentially be appropriate under Strickland, Whiteside, and a phalanx of ethics
materials, that morally motivated conduct may nonetheless have been
appropriate even if it represented poor trial strategy.
This judicial move is anything but rare.1 17 In Williams v. Kemp, for
example, the court rejected a claim that the defense attorney was ineffective for
111.

Id. at *22.

112. Id. at *23.
113. Id. at *24.
114. Id. at *25.

115. Id. at *23, *28.
116. Id. at *26.
117. See, e.g., Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (deeming counsel's refusal to
interview a witness who would testify to defendant's innocence when defendant had admitted the
alleged crimes reasonable, but nonetheless expressly rejecting the lower court's stipulation of an ethical
dilemma); Couch v. Trickey, 892 F.2d 1338, 1344 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting an ineffective assistance
claim where counsel refused to argue that defendant's intoxication represented a psychotic mental
illness on the ground that "[r]efraining from asserting or investigating an invalid defense [is]
reasonable"); Stead v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075 (D.S.D. 1999) (calling counsel's refusal
to use an intoxication defense when the defendant denied being intoxicated a "strategic decision.., well
within the range of professional reasonable judgment").

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 23:225, 2005

failing to hire expert witnesses to challenge the blood stains on the defendant's
118
boots and the handwriting on a threatening note the victim had received.
Alas, Williams had admitted to the police that he had been present for the
murder and had had physical contact with the victim, and he had admitted to
his lawyer that he wrote the note. 1 9 Yet, the court calls the defense attorney's
not to pursue
failure to challenge the blood evidence no more than a "decision
1 20
alternative defense theories" and thus "tactical" in nature.
This use of the alignment theory is particularly striking in light of the
court's use of an entirely different rationale to reject the claim for not
challenging the handwriting: It "fulfilled his ethical obligation to refrain from
producing false or misleading evidence."' 21 Instead of resorting reflexively to
Strickland, the judge recognized a tension between candor to the tribunal and
zealous advocacy and, it is instructive to note, cited to Whiteside, using the
signal "cf.," short for the Latin word "confer," meaning "compare."' 22 Making
this comparison is exactly what we argue judges do not do frequently enough.
It is, of course, perfectly sensible for a judge to be reluctant to refer to a refusal
to employ a handwriting expert when there is no evidence before the court to
contradict the expert's testimony as ethical lawyering rather than reasonable
trial strategy. It is also true, however, that refraining from introducing expert
testimony to refute blood evidence when such evidence is entirely consistent
with the admissions of the defendant could similarly be described as fulfilling
an ethical obligation. Where an attorney's decision is plausibly described as
trial strategy, courts are not in the habit of discussing the attorney's concurrent
ethical obligations. As we will discuss in Part IV, infra, this sin of omission is
problematic whether or not the decision is reasonable trial strategy in fact.
Our examination into judicial rationales leads us to a second potential
explanation for the disparity between the rationale for refusing to challenge the
handwriting and the rationale for refusing to challenge the blood on the boot.
For the defendant to deny that he was present at the murder scene sounds like
an alibi defense-it involves evidence about which a third party provides the
most effective testimony. For him to deny that he wrote the note sounds like
perjury-whether the defendant wrote the note is best gleaned from his own
testimony. Even though both attorney decisions could be defended on moral
grounds, the theory of the defense is a time-honored, indivisible, and
discretionary part of the criminal defense function. 123 The presentation of
perjured testimony, on the other hand, is directly frowned upon by a Supreme

118.
119.
120.
121.

846 F.2d 1276 (1l th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1279, 1281.
Id.at 1281.
Id. (citing Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 164-76.).

122. See id.

123. See, e.g., supranote 106 and accompanying text.
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Court opinion.'

24

D. Scenario Four: Other Morally Activist Attorney Decisions
Certain attorney decisions that may be characterized as morally activist do
not fit neatly into the aforementioned categories of refusal to participate in
perjured testimony or to present other false evidence or defenses. In
Vorgvongsa v. State, for example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
whether an attorney's refusal to impeach a state witness with prior inconsistent
statements constituted ineffective assistance. 125 The witness was a guest at an
ill-fated party that ended with the murder-outside the apartment-of another
guest who had called the defendant's friend a "chicken" for refusing to drink
cognac.'26 The witness had testified at a co-defendant's earlier trial that she had
seen people whom she could not identify chase the victim out of the apartment
in which the party was held, but left this piece out of her testimony at
Vorgvongsa's trial.' 27 The court credited defense counsel's explanation that he
had not impeached the witness because his theory of the case was that the
defendant was in fact guilty of the altercation in the apartment but did not
participate in the murder. Having this witness remain credible as to events
inside the apartment would raise doubts in the minds of jurors that the shooting
could have occurred outside the apartment with no witnesses. 28 Thus, counsel
129
made "a reasonable tactical decision.'
Whether or not this is true, it is worth noting that the witness's testimony
corroborated that of others that the defendant was brandishing a gun and
attempting to shoot the victim inside the apartment,' 30 and she testified that she
3
saw other guests push the victim out of the apartment to aid his escape.1 1

124. This dichotomy is starkly on display in the bizarre case of People v. LaVearn, 528 N.W.2d
721 (Mich. 1995). Counsel was charged with ineffective assistance for pursuing a misidentification
defense in a first-degree murder case where a successful intoxication defense would have reduced the
charge to second-degree murder. The court rejected the Sixth Amendment challenge on the grounds that
counsel was avoiding "the ethical problems that would have arisen had the defendant testified that he
lacked the intention to kill." Id. at 725 (relying on Whiteside). Yet implicit in the defendant's claim is
that he actually committed a killing. (It seems implausible that the defendant killed no one but

nonetheless wanted to argue intoxication because he thought the truth would get him wrongly convicted
of first-degree murder.) Given this admission, a misidentification defense would presumably have
presented an even bigger ethical dilemma than intoxication, a fact nowhere mentioned in the opinion.
Thus the LaVearn court saw an ethical problem in the false defendant testimony necessary for an
intoxication defense, but not in the impeachment of third parties necessary for an even "more" false
misidentification defense theory.
125.
126.

785 A.2d 542 (R.I. 2001).
Id. at 545.

127. Id.at 549.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See In re Vorgvongsa, No. 98-4502, 1999 R.I. Super. LEXIS 151, at *5-6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct.

20, 1999).
131.

Vorgvongsa, 785 A.2d at 549.
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While one cannot know for sure, it seems clear from the language of the
opinion in both the Supreme Court and the lower Superior Court that whether
or not the defense attorney actually considered the witness's credibility an
asset, the witness also happened to be in fact credible.' 32 The ethical propriety
of impeaching a credible witness is worthy of considerable discussion among
practicing attorneys, but alignment theory's constant drumbeat of strategic
deference ensures that this discussion remains in the background.
Similarly, in United States v. Eisen, the defendant accused his attorney of
ineffective assistance for not attempting to blame the charged crimes on codefendants. 133 Judge Newman wrote for a Second Circuit panel that "[a]n effort
to blame the other defendants might have provoked retaliation in the same
vein."' 34 No further discussion was necessary, and none occurred. If Eisen's
lawyer had wanted to argue that he was guided by his moral compass, it would
have been foolish for him to do so, and so the world will never know.
McClure v. Thompson offers a still more striking example of alignment
theory at work, this time in the client confidentiality context. 35 In McClure, a
defense attorney faced charges of ineffective assistance after anonymously
revealing to police the whereabouts of two missing children allegedly
kidnapped and killed by the defendant. The defendant, Robert A. McClure, was
accused of murdering a woman in her home and kidnapping her two
children.1 36 In the attorney's own notes, he wrote that after meeting with
McClure, he "was extremely agitated over the fact that these children might
still be alive."' 137 After getting McClure to reveal to him where the children (or
their bodies) might be, he received a phone call from McClure that evening38
telling him that "Satan" killed the mother and that "Jesus saved the kids."',
According to testimony of a state law enforcement official, the attorney decided
to tell the Sheriffs department the whereabouts of the children-who, it turns
out, had in fact been killed---despite warnings of sanctions.' 39 Indeed, the
attorney even testified in a deposition that, when he disclosed the location of
the bodies,140he was concerned more with the welfare of the children than that of
his client.
In his habeas petition, McClure alleged ineffectiveness in counsel's breach
of his duty of confidentiality and in his conflicting interest in the victims'

132.
1999 R.I.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 549 (noting the consistency between past and present statements); In re Vorgvongsa,
Super. LEXIS at *6.
974 F.2d 246, 266 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id.
323 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.
at 1235.
Id.
at 1236.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id. at 1238.
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welfare.' 41 As to the duty of confidentiality, the court held on disputed facts
that McClure's attorney did not adequately consult with him in making the
decision, but that the district court did not err in its finding that the breach was
permissible under an exception in the Model Rules for preventing acts that
could result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm."'1 42 Compared to the
alignment theory cases mentioned so far, McClure's confidentiality analysis
sounds refreshing. The court recognized a direct conflict between zealous
advocacy and moral obligations, weighed the competing interests, and made a
decision.
But then one reaches McClure's conflict of interest analysis. In rejecting
McClure's claim of a "fatal conflict of interest," the court relied primarily on
the attorney's claim that "the disclosure could have avoided two additional
aggravated murder charges and was the best strategic decision for petitioner
under the circumstances."'' 43 If open admissions by an attorney that his moral
concerns over the lives of two children trumped his concerns for his client's
interests was not sufficient for a court to admit a conflict between zealous
advocacy and candor-and offer a prescription for its resolution-then it is not
clear what would be.
The more enveloped an attorney's decision within the traditional defense
function-calling witnesses, making strategic decisions, making opening and
closing statements-the more reluctant courts are about acknowledging the
possibility of a client-candor dilemma. The general rule is not without some
exceptions, to be sure. 144 But these counter-examples serve only to emphasize
the inconsistency in this area. One court remarked that "it took a decision of the
United States Supreme Court to declare what in an ideal world would be selfevident-that a criminal defense lawyer who refused to tolerate perjury by his
client was not guilty of constitutionally deficient performance."' 145 Courts are
still waiting for guidance in other areas that involve morally activist
decisionmaking by attorneys. Wed to the adversarial model, courts seem to find
the most comfort in deference to strategic decisionmaking, refraining by and
large from discussions of moral decisionmaking. In this way, they avoid
evaluating attorney responses to the conflict between zealous advocacy and

141. Id. at 1241.
142. Id. at 1245-47 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1983)).
143. Id. at 1248.
144. See, e.g., Shockley v. Kearney, No. 95-207-SLR, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10939 (D. Del. July
25, 1996) (finding no ineffective assistance where an attorney did not, owing to ethical concerns, give a
closing argument corroborating defendant's perjury); People v. Berroa, 782 N.E.2d 1148 (N.Y. 2002)
(finding ineffective assistance where a defense attorney acted on ethical concerns and stipulated to
information that would impeach favorable testimony by defense witnesses); cf State v. Fritz, 569
N.W.2d 48 (Wisc. 1997) (finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel advised client to lie on
the stand rather than plead guilty). In all of these cases, the courts expressly acknowledged a tension
between ethical courses of action by attorneys and the interests of those attorneys' clients.
145. Fritz,569 N.W.2d at 52.
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candor to the tribunal in the numerous situations outside of the known perjury
context in which that conflict must somehow be resolved. We next consider
what this employment of the alignment theory means for modem American
criminal justice.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ALIGNMENT THEORY

As we have seen, courts reviewing Sixth Amendment claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel have often construed attorney behavior in a manner that
downplays potential incongruities between lawyers' ethical impulses and their
strategic preferences. That such incongruities exist can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, as we explain in greater detail in Section IV.A. In
Section IV.B, we analyze the consequences of judges' continued reliance on
alignment theory. By eschewing frank discussions of the competing demands
placed on criminal defense counsel, judges perpetuate a system in which
attorneys exercise moral discretion sub rosa and without sufficient formal
guidance. Section IV.C suggests practical ways of exchanging our current
adherence to alignment theory for a brand of judicial analysis that more
explicitly takes into account the ethical constraints affecting clientrepresentation decisions. Section IV.D responds to the most potent criticisms of
our proposal, emphasizing that our primary goal is to render more transparent
decisionmaking processes that are already in operation.
A.

In Defense ofMethodology

Critics of the alignment theory hypothesis will no doubt question how we
can know that the lawyers in the foregoing cases were not in fact motivated by
strategic rather than ethical considerations. After all, the mere fact that one can
read into a situation the possibility of a moral dilemma does not mean that
ethical concerns actually animated the lawyer in any particular case. While this
is undeniable, the difficulty of deciphering a lawyer's intentions after the fact
makes it all the more surprising that courts have, with such confidence and
consistency, credited the strategic motivations offered by actors while
simultaneously avoiding discussion of possible ethical considerations. The dual
values of candor to the tribunal and loyalty to the client necessarily conflict
under certain circumstances, some of which we have described above."' Some
theory is therefore needed to explain why courts have so consistently
acknowledged the ethical dilemma presented in the known perjury context yet
146. As the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct recognize, "[i]n the nature of law
practice... conflicting responsibilities [of the lawyer] are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from the conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to
the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory living." CONN.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003), reprintedin SEC. OF STATE OF THE STATE OF CONN., supra

note 1, at 2.
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failed to comment upon the potential ethical implications of an attorney's
decision to present unreliable evidence or advance a specious defense theory.
We contend that the strongest explanation for this phenomenon is that courts
(as well as lawyers in response to courts) have systematically bypassed
opportunities to comment openly on this conflict of values. Rather than extend
the logic of Whiteside to cover situations involving other kinds of
untrustworthy defenses, jurists have often opted for the safer alternative of
alignment theory.
Lending credence to this hypothesis is the fact that courts often cannot
identify plausible strategic explanations to account for certain actions taken by
criminal defense attorneys. Many of the cases we have already highlighted well
illustrate how purely tactical explanations are insufficient to account for
lawyers' conduct. In McClure, for instance, construing the lawyer's disclosure
of the kidnapping victims' whereabouts as a measured tactical choice taken
with the client's best interests in mind stretched the notion of the loyalty
principle to a breaking point. In that case, the principles of attorney-client
confidentiality and duty to client were directly at odds with the lawyer's
broader obligations, both to the children and to the tribunal handling the case.
The mere fact that the court could imagine a counterfactual scenario in which
the lawyer's having made a different decision might have worked out worse for
the client does not change the fact that disclosing such information in all
likelihood hurt, rather than helped, McClure.
Likewise, where omissions have been concerned, a lawyer's decision not to
call particular witnesses (as in Jordan)or raise particular evidentiary objections
(as in Williams) could be understood as a strategic form of damage control.
Logically, however, there must be a point at which stipulation to the key facts
in a murder trial becomes indefensible as a trial strategy. Without the further
suggestion that ethical considerations helped to explain a lawyer's conduct, the
fear of impeachment alone seems insufficient to justify such monumental
concessions as the fact that the defendant was at the scene of the murder, or that
an item in the defendant's possession was the murder weapon! In both of these
cases, clients had already made highly incriminating statements to their
lawyers. Yet, instead of considering how admissions of this nature might have
altered the defense attorneys' role with respect to the criminal proceeding as a
whole, courts bent over backwards to rationalize attorney decisions that on their
face seemed to undermine the defendants' claims of innocence. These
examples, as well as others cited in Part III, provide reliable indicators that
judges employ the language of strategic choice to mask the unspoken reality
that ethical considerations affect the manner in which criminal defense
attorneys represent their clients.
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The Consequences ofAlignment Theory

Perhaps the most immediate consequence of courts' reliance on alignment
theory is that it produces less persuasive doctrine in the area of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Assuming that the reasoning of judicial opinions affects
public perceptions of the courts' fairness toward criminal defendants, the
routine recitation of transparently flimsy tactical arguments, coupled with the
decision not to cite important ethical factors at play, potentially signals a
disturbing lack of solicitude for defendants' basic constitutional rights.
Furthermore, continued reliance on alignment theory undermines public
confidence in the criminal defense bar. As many commentators have observed,
courts' willingness to construe virtually any decision as the product of tactical
choice renders ineffective assistance of counsel challenges little more than a
weak formalism. 147 It is important to distinguish, however, between cases
where courts have accepted weak tactical arguments because there is an
extremely low threshold in terms of the quality of the criminal defense bar, and
those cases where relaxed standards of advocacy derive from ethically
motivated conduct on the part of lawyers. Assuming the latter occurs with some
frequency but courts are not in the habit of explaining the nature of the ethical
dilemma underpinning attorneys' decisions, one might more readily draw the
inference that the criminal defense bar is simply inadequate. Were courts
instead more forthright about the circumstances surrounding lawyers' conduct,
one might reach a different conclusion-that defense lawyers are occasionally
compelled to scale back the intensity of their representation for the sake of
complying with professional ethical obligations. Thus, courts' use of alignment
logic may unfairly compound negative public perceptions of criminal defense
lawyers. Even if we assume that the criminal defense bar is somehow defective,
the failure to specify why defense attorneys make ostensibly ineffective
representation decisions frustrates efforts to gauge the extent of the problem.
Each consequence of alignment theory that we have identified becomes
even less defensible in cases where judges intentionally rely upon the theory.
The judge who employs alignment theory out of unexamined path dependence
is surely part of the problem, but for her our observations amount to little more
than a (loud) alarm bell. On the other hand, a judge who knows that a flimsy
tactical argument is masking a moral concern, but persists in reciting a strategic
rationale, engages in her own brand of deception. Whatever we think of
lawyers, we expect more of our jurists.
The mere fact that courts turn to alignment theory to resolve Sixth
Amendment challenges does not necessarily imply that they are hostile to the

147. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, What Does It Mean to PracticeLaw "In the Interests of Justice "
in the Twenty-First Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1543, 1551 (2002) (decrying the pitiful standards
imposed by effective assistance of counsel law).
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notion that lawyers should behave as ethical actors, even in situations in which
this comes at the expense of their clients' best interests. On the contrary,
alignment theory may represent courts' attempts to create greater space for
ethical decisionmaking while working within the confines of an effective
assistance doctrine that is already strategically oriented. If this is the case, it is
deeply ironic that courts seek reform not by calling for ethical counterbalances
to the principle of zealous advocacy, but rather by construing or repackaging
ethical decisions as tactical ones. In paving the way for criminal defense
attorneys to depart more freely from the adversary system of justice, courts
borrow from the language of that very system that they seek to transcend.
To the extent that alignment theory ultimately broadens the scope of
attorneys' ethical discretion, it represents a useful legal fiction. Yet this comes
at the significant cost of further entrenching societal perceptions that the
adversary system is the most desirable model of criminal justice. Those
committed to alternative visions of the ideal role of the lawyer within the
criminal justice system will regard courts' use of alignment theory as an
unwanted legitimization of status quo norms. Even those generally in support
of the adversary system may prefer courts to construct an expanded conception
of effective assistance that openly acknowledges the importance of ethical
lawyering and on that basis prescribes relaxing the principle of zealous
advocacy. For this contingent, the real problem with a system that affords
lawyers autonomy under the rubric of deference to tactical decisionmaking is
that it fails to enunciate adequately the norm that ethical decisionmaking is
desirable within the legal profession.
Finally, the systematic repackaging of ethical behavior as strategic choice
by courts and lawyers alike reinforces the most cynical conception of what it
means to be a criminal defense attorney within our adversarial system. For
those lawyers with particularly strong ethical convictions, the prospect of
raising an alibi defense that they know to be false will seem so far beyond the
pale that they will gladly invest the necessary energy to shroud their actions in
the language of strategic choice when the matter arises on appeal. For many
others, however, the current doctrine will stifle their impulses of candor toward
the tribunal, guiding them instead to view the criminal justice system as a game
where all tactics are fair play as long as they help produce the desired verdict.
Alignment theory perpetuates the latter phenomenon both by raising the time
and energy costs associated with making an ethically motivated representation
decision and by depriving attorneys of judicially sanctioned illustrations of
such ethically motivated behavior.
C.

Towards an EthicalDiscourse

The most important remedy for the above concerns would be for courts to
acknowledge more consistently the ethical obligations that criminal defense
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attorneys face when deciding how to respond to clients who present
untrustworthy defenses. This amounts to an invitation for judges, when
reviewing these situations, to engage in more extensive fact finding concerning
the real reasons behind defense attorneys' representation decisions. In light of
current norms of legal practice, defense attorneys may initially be reluctant to
recite the ethical considerations that actually motivated their decisions to
withhold a particular piece of evidence or otherwise adjust their defense
approach. To help resolve this first-mover problem, judges should emphasize
that their assessment of what constitutes effective representation within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment will take into account prevailing norms of
professional conduct, just as Strickland prescribes. Citing Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.3, courts should clearly signal to counsel both through
published opinions and also during ineffective assistance of counsel hearings
that lawyers may alter the nature of their representation in response to
reasonable and well-founded ethical concerns about misleading the fact finder.
In order to demonstrate how this would work in practice, consider once
more our opening hypothetical about the criminal defense attorney faced with
deciding whether to offer an alibi defense that she strongly suspects is false.
We begin by highlighting two possible decisions that our proposal does not
affect. First, had the client insisted on taking the stand to lie about his
whereabouts on the night in question, the attorney could clearly have declined
to facilitate that act, citing Whiteside when the quality of her representation was
challenged on appeal. Second, had she instead opted to decline representation
altogether, her actions would not have come before a reviewing court in an
ineffective assistance of counsel proceeding-rather she would only have
needed to satisfy state standards for withdrawal. These rules may well have
been patterned after Model Rule 1.16(3)(b)(2), which specifies that counsel
may withdraw if, among other things, "the client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal
48
or fraudulent."'
The decisions that our proposal does affect are those in which attorneys are
asked to present dishonest or misleading claims or defenses. Our suggested
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel would uphold a lawyer's
representation decisions even when these decisions may not have maximized
her client's narrow strategic goals, provided that the lawyer could demonstrate
on appeal that (1) she reasonably believed in good faith that another course of
action would have perpetrated a fraud on the court, and (2) she had a sound
factual basis for this belief. Anticipating the need to make such showings in an
ineffective assistance of counsel hearing, lawyers would almost always adhere
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.16(3)(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). The Model
Rules have been adopted, with variations, in more than three dozen states and the District of Columbia.
Several other states are considering adopting them. Silver, supra note 18, at 349.
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to the model of zealous advocacy, deviating only where absolutely necessary to
preserve the integrity of the proceeding.
In each instance, reviewing judges would be responsible for scrutinizing the
evidence that lawyers cite as the basis for their challenged decision. In addition
to considering the attorney's explanation, a reviewing judge could evaluate the
evidence withheld below or compare the outcome of one defendant's trial to a
co-defendant's trial, where counsel in that case pursued a different defense
theory. Clearly, under the reasonable belief and sound factual basis standards,
an attorney's simple dislike for a client or mere suspicion that a client is not
being forthright would be rejected as bases for deviating from the zealous
advocacy model. In such scenarios, the attorney's conduct would be deemed to
have violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, resulting in a retrial
(assuming Strickland's prejudice standard is also satisfied).1 49 Furthermore,
attorneys would still be expected to have pursued the most zealous form of
advocacy that was consistent with her obligation of candor to the tribunal. In
other words, even when a lawyer senses that her client may be guilty, she
would still be obligated to present all facts and arguments that she does not
reasonably suspect are false.
While the precise legal standard could always be calibrated to ensure even
fewer deviations from the zealous advocacy model, we have settled upon the
reasonableness and sound factual basis standards because this language mirrors
that contained in the ABA's Model Rules. According to Model Rule 3.3(a)(3),
"A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of the
defendant, that the lawyer reasonablybelieves is false."' 150 As we have seen, the
ABA's standards for permitting counsel to withdraw from representation use a
similar "reasonable belief' standard. If lawyers may withdraw entirely from a
case on the basis of reasonable suspicion of fraud, then afortiorithey should be
allowed to refrain from presenting a particular piece of evidence or pursuing a
specific defense theory when they harbor the same degree of concern. As with
any common-law standard, the content of the reasonableness test will be
worked out by judges reviewing attorney conduct, often in habeas proceedings,
on a case-by-case basis.

149. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (defining prejudicial error as that
which is "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable").
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003) (emphasis added). In fact, some
courts have already applied similar evidentiary standards when reviewing attorney representation
decisions. See supra note 81. We recognize that the situation involving a criminal defendant who wishes
to testify poses a special problem to our proposal because of the defendant's constitutionally protected
fight to testify. Here, we are in agreement with the Model Rules:
Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants ... a lawyer [may not]
refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know
that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must

honor the client's decision to testify.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 9 (2003).
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Over time, lawyers may respond to a broadened conception of effective
assistance by more forthrightly describing the ethical considerations that led
them to choose a particular course of action, even when this involved a tradeoff
in terms of the affected client's interest. Rather than contorting morally square
decisions to fit into the round hole of effective trial strategy, lawyers could
more freely declare the moral basis for their choice, confident that as long as
they could demonstrate a good-faith basis for that belief, their choice would be
honored by the reviewing judge as consistent with the lawyer's duties under the
circumstances.
Such a development would yield several major advantages. First, greater
willingness to identify the potential ethical motivations behind defense
attorneys' decisions would prompt more extensive debate within the legal
community about how to strike the appropriate balance between the values of
candor to the tribunal and loyalty toward the client. By highlighting the many
junctures at which our criminal justice system asks lawyers to serve competing
masters, we may heighten appreciation for the difficult tradeoffs that defense
attorneys often must face. While there can be no easy resolution of these
dilemmas, courts should follow the example set by drafters of model rules of
professional conduct in at least attempting to reach workable compromises in a
principled fashion, taking into account public and professional input.
Second, a move away from alignment theory would offer practicing
lawyers clearer guidance as to how far they may exercise moral discretion
without running afoul of the loyalty principle, at least as embodied in the Sixth
Amendment effective assistance of counsel guarantee. Under the status quo,
individual lawyers must first determine how to balance their ethical impulses
with their duties to their clients and then decide how best to repackage their
decision in strategic terms. A more forthright judicial approach in this area
would not only offer criminal defense attorneys greater initial guidance in
responding to difficult dilemmas, but would also save unnecessary expenditures
of time and energy after the fact by allowing lawyers to present the real reasons
for their choices without fear of reproach. The truth, as they say, is easier to
remember.
Finally, a more overt ethical discourse would reinforce our highest
aspirations for the criminal justice process. Rather than craft ethical rules under
the assumption that all lawyers are apt to abuse their discretion, we should
design the system to enable well-intentioned lawyers to make ethical decisions.
In practice, this would reinforce lawyers' perceptions that they belong to a
learned profession rather than simply a business' 51 and encourage them to
assess more honestly the ethical dilemmas they confront. A system designed
151. But see Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalismParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct andReputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995) (arguing
that acknowledging that the practice of law is a business will help to improve lawyering).
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otherwise would offer no incentive for lawyers to cite ethical motivations in
circumstances in which their conduct became subject to judicial review.
Without frequent reinforcements of the notion that ethical instincts may
properly guide lawyers' decisions, we fear that lawyers' ethical instincts are
more likely to atrophy, to the detriment of the profession as a whole.
D. Responding to Critics

Not surprisingly, the suggestion that criminal defense attorneys should be
permitted to alter their representation of clients on the basis of ethical
misgivings raises several criticisms. The most serious of these are that lawyers
may seize upon ethical justifications as a means of denying high-quality
representation to disfavored clients either deliberately or due to subconscious
biases; that lawyers will prejudge the guilt or innocence of their clients, thereby
short-circuiting the jury's role as fact finder; and that clients will no longer feel
comfortable sharing information with their attorneys for fear that this may
somehow deny them the best defense possible. By addressing each of these
concerns in turn, we hope to bolster support for our critique of alignment
theory.
1.

Attorney-ClientBias Criticism

One important concern may be that lawyers would use the rules governing
candor to the tribunal to effectuate their social prejudices or moral judgments
about a client's character. Thus, a lawyer might refuse to present a client's
legitimate defense because she thinks the client is a bad person, yet find
52
sufficient flexibility in the rules to justify that decision as an "ethical" one.,
As Professor Jay Silver warns, "[empirical] tendencies suggest a race- and
class-based double standard in the application of the client perjury rules. ' 53 In
some cases, such double standards could emerge even without deliberate
discrimination on the part of lawyers. For instance, a lawyer who harbors
subconscious prejudices with respect to certain racial groups may genuinely
doubt information that minority clients provide without realizing the extent to
which those doubts are based on unfounded assumptions and biases rather than

152. See, e.g., Janine Sisak, Confidentiality, Counseling, and Care: When Others Need to Know
What Clients Need to Disclose, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2747, 2763 (1997) (advising lawyers to be
"skeptical" about making a moral decision "according to her moral preference, and then imposing it on
the client in a paternalistic manner"). See also Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO
ST. L.J. 551, 567 (1991) ("It is not [the lawyer's) job ... to breach the bounds of their clients' moral
integrity and, directly or indirectly, impose the lawyers' moral preferences on their clients.").
153. Silver, supra note 16, at 359. Silver goes on to contend that permitting ethical decisionmaking,
at least with respect to perceived client pejury, "engender[s] racial, cultural, and class-based
discrimination, miscommunication, and distrust," because such decisions will disproportionately be
invoked by the "largely white, middle-class American criminal trial bar against indigent, minority
criminal defendants." Id. at 425.
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objective evidence. 1
The potential for a lawyer to shield, by reference to the ethical rules, her
refusal to credit the claims of clients of a certain ethnic or cultural background
is obviously troubling. Yet our proposal is unlikely to increase the risk of such
behavior. Currently, attorneys succeed in defending a wide range of
representation decisions under the banner of strategic choice. These cases
surely include situations in which attorneys manage to obscure their own
illegitimate biases by citing a barely plausible strategic rationale for their
representation decisions. Because courts are in the habit of accepting even the
flimsiest of strategic explanations, this conduct goes essentially unchecked. Our
proposal to separate out cases in which ostensibly strategic decisions were
actually motivated by ethical concerns would not increase the risk of bias over
and above the status quo. If anything, the very fact that courts would be more
committed to scrutinizing the true reasons behind a given representation
decision would reduce the risk that lawyers would elect to weaken their
representation, because they would anticipate more difficulty in escaping
scrutiny on appeal.
Moreover, our proposal relies on the ability of reviewing judges to prevent
attorneys from abusing the system by citing ethical justifications for behavior
that was in fact motivated by bias. Our standard is a demanding one, and does
not condone explanations on the order of, "He wasn't looking me in the eye,"
as justifications for altering representation. Rather, like the current inquiry into
"known" client perjury, it requires a fact-based inquiry into a lawyer's reasons
for making particular decisions within her discretion. Any criticism that centers
on the inability of judges to apply rigorous doctrinal standards strikes at the
very legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking.' 55 Because we believe that judges
regularly apply doctrinal standards such as the one we propose, we ultimately
reject this criticism.
2.

Supplanting the FactFinder Criticism

A second criticism of our proposal may be that it invites lawyers to
prejudge the guilt or innocence of clients, transforming defense counsel into
just another arm of the state. As Professor Silver argues, client perjury rules
"conceal at the center of our criminal trials a summary inquisition into the

154. See Marjorie Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering, and Race, 3 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 219 (2002) (discussing the prevalence of subconscious racial bias in the criminal justice
system). We focus on race rather than on other aspects of identity such as gender and sexual orientation
because race is far more salient in the criminal defense context.
155. Professor Jay Silver's observation that defense attorneys have disproportionately invoked
client-perjury rules when representing black defendants does not speak to the actual outcomes of these
cases. It is not unreasonable to suppose therefore that the courts presiding over these claims weeded out
many of those arguments that were actually pretexts for racial discrimination.
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truthfulness of the accused's testimony"' 156 and deprive the fact finder "of the
opportunity57to learn directly about the defendant's credibility and her version of
the facts."'

By introducing subjective decisionmaking at this stage, the lawyer may
effectively supplant the role of the fact finder, jeopardizing her client's right to
a fair trial with due process. 58 Of further concern is the fact that lawyers are
often exposed during the investigation phase to substantial amounts of
"hearsay, inflammatory remarks, conjecture, and otherwise unreliable
information."'1 59 For the same reasons that we assiduously exclude such
information from the jury's consideration, we may be reluctant to encourage a
lawyer to use it as the basis for decisions about the veracity of a client's
defense. Because the task of predicting the accuracy of a particular claim or
defense strategy is daunting, lawyers should perhaps leave such determinations
to the jury. In the words of Professor Silver, too great an emphasis on candor to
the tribunal "indirectly undermine[s] the very truth-finding function of the trial
process they purportedly serve" 160 by "upset[ting] the balance of
responsibilities and powers allocated among the prosecutor, defense attorney,
judge, and jury in adversarial criminal proceedings."' 61
As a preliminary matter, this criticism assumes that attorneys will on the
basis of their own moral intuitions seek to deny their clients an opportunity to
testify or otherwise provide them with no outlet for presenting a favorable case.
This criticism, however, fundamentally misapprehends the scope of our
proposal. It has not been our position that lawyers should on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion be empowered to stop their clients from exercising their
constitutional right to testify. Rather, our focus has been on the lawyer's
discretion in deciding which pieces of evidence to present or which defense
theories to pursue, decisions traditionally within the scope of the defense
function. Therefore, in assessing the strength of this criticism, it is important to
recognize that we are discussing lawyers who have decided to continue
representing their clients and who have merely asserted the right to select the
manner in which they will do so subject to certain ethical constraints.
Of course, one may still argue that juries should be presented with every
piece of potentially exculpatory evidence and that any pre-screening in which a
156. Silver, supra note 18, at 425.
157. Id. at 357. See also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
EndangeredRight?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 100 (1991) (quoting Justice Blackmun's concurrence in
Whiteside to claim that "attorneys who 'adopt the role of judge and jury to determine the facts.., pose a
danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment').
158. See e.g., Silver, supra note 18, at 354-403; see also Garcia, supra note 157, at 98 (suggesting
that permitting lawyers to employ ethical considerations in the representation of their clients potentially
"reduce[es] the scope of the right to counsel").
159. Silver, supra note 18, at 386.

160. Id. at 354.
161.

Id. at406.
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lawyer engages is illegitimate. Yet if one accepts the central hypothesis of
alignment theory, one must also concede that lawyers routinely screen
information from juries in the present system. The principal innovation
introduced by our proposal is just that lawyers should more openly
acknowledge the extent to which they have withheld certain information or
declined to pursue certain defense theories. For this reason, much of the sting
associated with Silver's critique fades away.
More fundamentally, it strikes us that on balance the truth-seeking function
of criminal trials is enhanced by broadening the scope of ethical
decisionmaking. The alternative to a system in which lawyers may decline to
present untrustworthy information to the fact finder is one where the entire
truth-seeking function of the proceeding may be frustrated by the presentation
of misinformation. 62 In the final analysis, our confidence that a jury can
decipher truth from falsehood rests on the assumption that lawyers are making
good-faith presentations. If we regard the jury as a decision-making device, it is
only as reliable as its informational inputs. By allowing lawyers to present
faulty information under the banner of loyalty to the client, we frustrate the fact
finder's core purpose of reaching an accurate verdict. Because jurors recognize
that lawyers are advocates, they may expect presentations of evidence to be
incomplete and slanted in one side's favor. While we may expect jurors to be
effective evaluators of evidence, however, it strains the limits of their
competence to expect them to decide whether the lawyers are outright lying to
them. Insofar as this takes place, the jury's task of deciphering the truth
becomes substantially more difficult and may be frustrated entirely.
On this critical point, Professor Silver provides only a weak response. He
suggests that "[p]ermitting counsel to call a criminal defendant whom she
believes will testify untruthfully may, in the end, actually advance the
adversarial search for truth. A defendant's confused, conflicting, fantastic, or
incomplete testimony or suspicious demeanor frequently represents, in the
minds of jurors, the clearest proof that the defendant's version of the case is
untruthful.' ' 163 Silver's argument carries less force in the wide range of

circumstances in which the client has not chosen to take the stand. Moreover, it
places an extraordinary amount of pressure on juries to suppose that they can
take well-crafted evidence that is false and entirely decode it, arriving at the
correct conclusion in a high percentage of cases. Finally, where falsehoods are
indeed accompanied by truths, lawyers operating within our paradigm could
distinguish between the two, declining to present the former while vigorously
162. As the commentary to Rule 3.3 of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct states: "The
alternative (to a rule favoring candor to the tribunal] is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court,
thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement."
CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3. cmt. (2003), reprinted in SEC. OF STATE OF STATE OF CONN.,

supra note 1,at 24.
163. Silver, supranote 18, at 355.
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asserting the latter.
In response to specific concerns about hearsay and other prejudicial
information arising out of a lawyer's investigative efforts, it is worth recalling
that this information may have an undeniable probative value. Indeed, this is
reflected by the fact that judges have long considered such information in the
sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. To prevent lawyers from relying on
such information before trial would therefore seem to undermine the truthseeking process. Furthermore, courts assessing the reasonable basis for
lawyers' hesitancy of representation could consider the nature of the evidence
relied upon. Where this appears to be unreliable hearsay uncorroborated by any
other evidence, lawyers would less likely be allowed to escape their duties as a
zealous advocate.
At the heart of this dispute over the responsibilities of lawyers versus jurors
may lie an important philosophical schism. If one agrees with the long-held
doctrine that defendants have no right "to the luck of a lawless
decisionmaker, '' 64 one must contemplate a truth-seeking role for every
participant in the adversary process. Seen in this light, the "balance of
responsibilities and powers" is at least as upset by the countless defendants who
escape punishment because of their untruthful testimony, for whom retrial or
the raising of post-acquittal issues is barred by double jeopardy. Greater
solicitude for candor only mitigates their good fortune. 65 By keeping squarely
in mind that the adversary system is not a game but rather a device for
uncovering truths, adjustments to the system may be regarded not as unfair
penalties but as necessary correctives that promote truth-seeking, the larger
purpose of the criminal trial.
3.

ChillingAttorney-Client Communication Criticism

A third criticism of our proposal is that by encouraging attorneys to give
voice to ethical misgivings, we may damage an already delicate relationship
between criminal defendants and their lawyers. As the theory holds, a client is
less likely to be forthcoming in his interactions with an attorney who seems
unwilling to give voice to claims she believes lacks credibility or, as in
McClure, seems willing to reveal client confidences in the service of other
ends. Where the relationship is already marred by the suspicions raised by race
and class disparities between lawyers and clients, 166 encouraging lawyers to
dust off their ethical compasses may exacerbate the problem.

164. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
165. Moreover, we note that concerns over lawyers supplanting the fact-finding function of the jury
are no less assuaged under a "reasonable doubt" standard or in Whiteside's "known" perjury scenario.
Thus, unless one is willing to take the Monroe Freedman position, see supra note 75, which we are not,
this concern proves too much.
166. See Silver, supra note 154.
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Before addressing this criticism, it is worth commenting on its scope. The
critique contemplates a class of criminal defendants who, all other things being
equal, would trust their attorneys enough to reveal certain confidences but who
turn fatally suspicious due to a change in the standards and rhetoric of appellate
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It is undisputed that lawyers
who are presently encouraged to represent ethical misgivings as strategic
choices are doing a good job of fooling this class of clients. For this criticism to
be plausible, therefore, we must suppose that our proposed change would
suddenly alert clients to the possibility that lawyers they would otherwise have
trusted may be running their claims through a "new," more rigorous ethical test.
We contend that the class of individuals for whom this information would be
material is vanishingly small.
Moreover, the class of individuals would need to be sensitive and/or
sophisticated enough to respond to the cues of appellate judges, cues that
presently have the effect of encouraging gamesmanship on the part of lawyers.
Of course, it is difficult to evaluate how such an eccentric class of persons
responds to the language of the adversary system under the status quo. Does a
system that (by the critique's hypothesis) encourages lawyers either to present
unreliable claims or to lie about whether such claims are unreliable lead clients
in the class just described to reveal truthful information to their lawyers? This
proposition is questionable at best. If the information they are revealing to their
lawyers is not truthful, is it a bad outcome if our proposal encourages them to
keep that information to themselves? Again, this is far from clear. Whatever
force this criticism might have in theory, it stems from a highly dubious
empirical premise, and indeed one that is best tested by implementing our
proposal.
In calling for a more open recognition of the ethical dimensions of the
criminal defense function, we share the concern of those who hold that
attorneys must not be permitted to impose their own value judgments or shortcircuit the jury function by arbitrarily declining to pursue the best legal
strategies on behalf of their more disfavored clients. Fortunately, our proposed
restructuring of the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel would not
promote such undesirable outcomes. By requiring that lawyers have a
reasonable and well-supported belief in the risk of fraud before altering their
style of representation, in keeping with the standards employed within codes of
professional ethics, and by insisting that reviewing courts rigorously police this
standard, we are confident that lawyers would be successfully deterred from
engaging in such reprehensible behavior. Whatever objections one may raise
against moral activism within the criminal-defense bar generally, these are not
exacerbated by a proposal that merely emphasizes the need for greater
transparency. By acknowledging the extent to which ethical considerations
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already guide representation decisions, the public and the legal profession
could more effectively debate the proper balance between zealous advocacy
and candor to the tribunal. Finally, to whatever extent such transparency might
entrench a role for ethical lawyering, we accept this result and assert that it is
proper for courts to recognize certain ethical limits on the adversarial game of
justice.
V. CONCLUSION

Emerson never explained the distinction between a foolish consistency and
a wise one,167 but it is no doubt the difference between blind and considered
devotion. That we maintain our adversary system of justice for legitimate
reasons we do not dispute. The system promotes a relationship of trust between
the accused and his advocate that can have tremendous dignitary value. The
adversary system is intentioned with a common law and philosophical tradition
that finds voice in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments: No
matter whether individuals are guilty or innocent, they all deserve their day in
court. No less important than the expressive value of the adversarial system,
however, is its truth-seeking value. While it may be that no criminal
investigation ever would be conducted by paying two people to advocate the
leading theories as best they could, the trust relationship between a defendant
and his attorney is so crucial in part because the accused cannot be expected to
tell the truth to a lawyer who will not scorch the Earth in his interests. This
undeniable aspect of the adversarial function introduces an irony: The
adversary system both aids the search for truth and undermines it. A considered
devotion to the system depends intimately on our confronting this tension.
The dilemma manifests itself whenever an attorney must decide whether to
persist with testimony, evidence, or a defense she believes unreliable. We have
argued that while ethics authorities, in the form of model codes, ABA
statements, and panel opinions, have evolved towards allowing greater space
for a lawyer faced with this choice to be guided by moral deliberation, many
courts considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether willfully
or not, have engaged in a form of subterfuge. They have effectively given space
for attorneys to allow morality to inform their decisionmaking but, outside the
context of known client perjury, they have justified this space as permissible
trial strategy. The effect is that courts blindly construe attorney decisions
potentially motivated by moral considerations, in tension with the interests of
their client, as tactical decisions consistent with those interests. In so doing,
judges have weighed down the trend towards a justice system more acute to

167. See RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance (1841), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF RALPH

WALDO EMERSON 47, 58 (Edward W. Emerson ed., 1883) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of
little minds .... ).
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plain dealing and just outcomes with the adversary system's rhetoric of
obfuscation and guile. We suggest that this judicial tendency, what we call the
"alignment theory," frustrates an admirable trend and gives little guidance to
the morally activist attorney. Instead, courts should openly acknowledge the
conflicts lawyers face and apply to lawyers' decisions a "reasonable belief'
standard robust enough to cover the full panoply of morally informed
decisionmaking.
Admittedly, we have deliberately avoided discussing the history of the
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine and how the morally activist lawyer
fared under the "farce and mockery" standard of old.168 We have not performed
a controlled study of the effect of Whiteside on judicial treatment of morally
attentive lawyering. Neither have we assessed current trends in judicial
responses to the many ethical issues that confront attorneys in civil cases. All of
these areas remain ripe for future research. The modest claim we do advance
derives from our view that, simply stated, judicial language matters. It provides
guidance to attorneys and their clients and vindicates the expressive value of
the criminal justice process. Courts send the murkiest of messages when they
downplay the defense lawyer's most fundamental dilemma, the unavoidable
reality that sometimes the truth hurts.

168. Before courts in the 1970s began to utilize a "reasonable competence" standard for analyzing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976),
appellate courts faced with such claims asked whether the attorney's performance rendered the trial a
"farce and mockery of justice." See United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) ("A lack
of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and
make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice."); see also Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669
(D.C. Cir. 1945).

